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INTRODUCTION
The American legal system embeds the principles of life, liberty, and
property in its foundation. Yet, there is no consensus about what these
words mean. Both political parties espouse these principles while
frequently promoting radically different policies in their names. The lofty
Lockean triumvirate can also create societal cognitive dissonance in times
when its three core principles clash. In responding to the coronavirus, the
United States faces questions that pit these values against each other.
Should we embrace stay-at-home orders (restricting our physical liberty)
to protect the lives of the vulnerable? How should individuals be punished
who violate laws designed to protect public health? Can the federal
government seize a private business’s or a state’s supply of masks?
Since the outbreak of COVID-19—colloquially known as the
coronavirus—America has grappled with the trade-offs between
individual freedoms and the health of society at large. The coronavirus is
making people question “Americanness” and fundamental rights in new
ways. For example, public and private Fourth of July fireworks
celebrations around the nation were cancelled or forced to go digital in
2020 due to COVID-19.1 Many state and local governments have capped
attendance at religious services—including on major religious holidays
(like Easter)—and until Justice Amy Coney Barrett replaced Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, a majority of the Supreme Court did not reject these types
of caps.2 Coronavirus laws have even restricted citizens’ freedom of
1. Charles Passy & Wenxin Fan, July Fourth Celebrations Are Subdued as
U.S. Coronavirus Cases Surge, WALL STREET J. (July 4, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-coronavirus-cases-surge-into-fourth-of-july-weekend11593864203 [https://perma.cc/7AGP-KZFA] (noting that “[f]or many
Americans, the pandemic has upended the traditional holiday celebrations, as
fireworks displays have gone virtual or been canceled”).
2. Prior to Justice Amy Coney Barrett joining the Supreme Court, the Court
had been more deferential to state authorities on public health measures. Compare
S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020)
(denying application for injunctive relief from California’s cap limiting
attendance at religious services to 25% capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is
lower), with Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020)
(enjoining Governor Cuomo of New York from enforcing an executive order
imposing 10- and 25-person occupancy limits pending the disposition of the
Second Circuit appeal on Free-Exercise-Clause grounds, and noting that
Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge was “likely to prevail”). In South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, the majority reasoned that the California
order restricted gatherings, more leniently treated only dissimilar activities (that
is, those not involving congregation or extended physical proximity), and noted
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movement between and among the states, with many states, such as New
York, imposing mandatory quarantines on certain out-of-state travelers.3
While many Americans may be confronting these issues for the first
time in their lives because of the coronavirus, these issues are far from
new, and over the years all levels of government have addressed how to
balance communicable disease containment and liberty interests.
This Article discusses the extent to which national and state
governments currently exercise their authority to prevent the spread of
communicable diseases, using two communicable diseases as examples:
COVID-19 and Ebola.4 These two outbreaks are useful foils for each other,
while still having enough similarities to make comparison useful.
that the Constitution primarily entrusts the states with the power to regulate issues
of health and safety of the people. By contrast, in Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, the Court noted that other places where individuals
congregate, including factories and schools, were treated less harshly than the
religious groups, even though those groups had “admirable safety records.”
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67; see also Temple Baptist
Church v. City of Greenville, 4:20-cv-00064-DMB-JMB, R. Doc. #6 (N. D. Miss.
2020); Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Rejects Church Challenge to California’s
Limits on In-Person Services During the Pandemic, WALL STREET J. (May 30,
2020, 2:57 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-rejects-churchchallenge-to-californias-limits-on-in-person-services-during-the-pandemic1
1
5
9
0
8
2
1
8
1
9
[https://perma.cc/7XKW-HNTJ]; Brent Kendall, Coronavirus Restrictions Can’t
Disfavor Churches, Justice Department Says, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 14, 2020,
8:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ coronavirus-restrictions-cant-disfavorchurches-justice-department-says-11586903463 [https://perma.cc/CA98-E53U]
(citing the U.S. statement of interest filed in a federal court case addressing church
restrictions in the age of the coronavirus, which noted the balance between
protecting fundamental rights and the government’s temporary, emergency
powers by stating, “There is no pandemic exception . . . to the fundamental
liberties the Constitution safeguards . . . .” At the same time, the Constitution does
not hobble government from taking necessary, temporary measures to meet a
genuine emergency).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”);
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 205 (June 24, 2020) (“All travelers entering New York from
a state with a positive test rate higher than 10 per 100,000 residents, or higher than
a 10% test positivity rate, over a seven day rolling average, will be required to
quarantine for a period of 14 days consistent with Department of Health
regulations for quarantine.”).
4. There are, of course, other recent examples of viral outbreaks. Zika is a
notable example. The Zika virus is substantially less severe than Ebola. Symptoms
of Zika include fever, rash, joint pain, conjunctivitis, muscle pain, and headache.
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On the one hand, the coronavirus is a comparatively easily transmitted
virus with a low mortality rate for the population at large; it has spread
worldwide and is a global pandemic the scale of which has not been seen
in approximately 100 years. It is commonly described as the “novel
coronavirus” because, up until the end of 2019, it was completely
unknown.
On the other hand, Ebola is a comparatively difficult-to-transmit virus
with a high mortality rate—in the epidemic, of the eleven people treated
in the U.S., the fatality rate was 18%—for the population at large; although
there were a handful of cases on American soil, it was contained. At the
time of the 2014–2016 outbreak, it was generally well understood, since it
had been studied since its discovery in 1976.
Both viruses triggered American legal disputes pitting the value of
liberty (e.g., freedom of movement) against that of life (e.g., promotion of
public health).
This Article does not address all the legal issues raised by contagious
disease law, but instead focuses on those involving the rights of physical
liberty and property rights through the lens of COVID-19 and Ebola. For
the purposes of this Article, physical liberty includes freedom from
apprehension and detention and freedom of movement.
In many ways, current quarantine laws and civil commitment laws
undermine due process protections of innocent disease victims. System
Zika Virus: Symptoms, Testing, & Treatment, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Jan. 3, 2019), http://www.cdc.gov/zika/symptoms/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G4T5-QWJW]. It is rarely fatal. Id. It is primarily spread
through the bite of an infected Aedes species of mosquito, although in rare cases
it can be passed through sexual contact or from mother to child during pregnancy
or birth. Zika Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July
24, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/zika/prevention/transmission-methods.html
[https://perma.cc/FD6H-FYMA]. “In 2015 and 2016, large outbreaks of Zika
virus occurred in the Americas, resulting in an increase in travel-associated cases
in US states, widespread transmission in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands,
and limited local transmission in Florida and Texas.” Zika Virus: Statistics and
Maps, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 7, 2019), https://
www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/index.html [https://perma.cc/QSR9-3BTH]. In 2016
alone, there were 5,168 symptomatic Zika virus disease cases reported in the
United States and an additional 36,512 in United States Territories. Zika Virus:
2016 Case Counts in the US, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/2016-case-counts.html
[https://perma.cc/8MVC-7CG7]. By 2017, “the number of reported Zika virus
disease cases in the United States started to decline.” Zika Virus: Statistics and
Maps, supra.
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failures during the Ebola outbreak show that state laws can erode the
property rights of Americans and suggest that when panic sweeps the
nation, the current system fails to protect public health or safeguard
individual rights, prioritizing fear-based reactions over responses based on
medical science.5 Other failures have plagued the American coronavirus
response, including a similar unwillingness to make science-based
decisions as well as many individuals conflating their personal
perspectives and opinions regarding liberty with constitutional rights.
To address these failures, Section I of this Article sets forth a general
introduction to COVID-19 and Ebola and provides the factual background
of the current pandemic and the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic.6 It also
compares and contrasts COVID-19 and Ebola to illuminate how legal
violations during the United States’ two most notable recent outbreaks
threaten liberty interests. Section II explains the liberty interests at stake
and the threats that current federal and Louisiana laws pose to these liberty
interests. Section III analyzes how current laws threaten property interests,
as seen through a detailed discussion of Thomas Eric Duncan, an Ebola
victim in Texas, and through the Louisiana Emergency Health Powers Act.
Finally, Section IV offers a proposal for striking a scientifically-informed
5. For example, public health failures in the case of Thomas Eric Duncan
include a hospital’s failure to screen him for Ebola even though he went to the
hospital on September 25, 2014—in the midst of the Ebola outbreak. Greg
Botelho, U.S. Ebola Patient: The Travels and Health Travails of Thomas Eric
Duncan, CNN (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/01/health
/us-ebola-patient/ [https://perma.cc/GZ8A-5XJJ]. Even though he reportedly
informed the health care workers at the hospital that he had recently traveled to
Liberia, the hospital did not screen him for Ebola, and he was discharged after
spending a mere five hours in the hospital because his symptoms were
“not . . . specific to Ebola.” Id. On the other hand, the destruction of the contents
of his apartment reflects a failure to safeguard private property rights. See infra
notes 205–26 and text accompanying.
6. There have been numerous Ebola outbreaks from 2014 through the time
of this writing. The largest, and the only multinational outbreak, started in March
2014 and lasted for two-and-a-half years. It spanned multiple countries in West
Africa. For the purposes of this paper, “Ebola outbreak” refers to this large, West
African epidemic. Separate outbreaks occurred in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from August to November 2014 and in certain regions of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in 2017, 2018, and 2020. History of Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD) Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html [https://perma.cc/MZU4
-P4TM]; 2014–2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.cdc .gov/vhf/ebola/
history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html [https://perma.cc/W7ZA-WZ6A].
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balance between public health and liberty laws in Louisiana. As discussed
in greater detail below, the proposal requires that Louisiana lawmakers:
(1) specifically grant due process protections to those who are considered
to be a “disease risk”; (2) protect fundamental rights by enacting leastrestrictive alternative requirements in the communicable disease context;
(3) restrict the seizure and destruction of potentially contaminated
property unless necessary and insulate property-holders from paying for
decontamination or destruction measures; and (4) provide a remedy for
individuals whose rights under the amended law are violated.
I. CONTEMPORARY CRISES: COVID-19 AND EBOLA
During the 10-year period from 2011 to 2021, a number of viral
infections have threatened American shores. Two of these—COVID-19 &
Ebola—are addressed in this Article.
A. COVID-19 Pandemic
The novel coronavirus first appeared in China at the end of 2019.7
Based on field investigations, epidemiologists determined the virus
possibly came from an animal sold at a wet market in China, meaning that
it was likely zoonotic in origin.8 Despite the strong evidence that the wet
market played a role in spreading the virus early on, the exact origins of
the disease are not definitively known, with some—including former
President Trump—speculating that the virus actually originated at the
nearby Wuhan Institute of Virology.9

7. COVID-19: Identifying the Source of the Outbreak, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/cases-updates/about-epidemiology/identifying-source-outbreak.html
[https://perma.cc/EE2M-CHHC].
8. Id.; Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(June 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtime
line [https://perma.cc/C8KN-P294].
9. Jon Cohen, Mining Coronavirus Genomes for Clues to the Outbreak’s
(Jan.
31,
2020,
6:20
PM),
Origins,
SCIENCE
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/mining-coronavirus-genomes-cluesoutbreak-s-origins [https://perma.cc/9AEW-8R65] (explaining, “Strong evidence
suggests the marketplace played an early role in spreading 2019-nCoV, but
whether it was the origin of the outbreak remains uncertain. Many of the initially
confirmed 2019-nCoV cases—27 of the first 41 in one report, 26 of 47 in
another—were connected to the Wuhan market, but up to 45%, including the
earliest handful, were not. This raises the possibility that the initial jump into
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In the following months, the coronavirus case count exploded,
spreading around the world and leading the World Health Organization to
characterize it as a pandemic—or an epidemic that has spread over a large
area—on March 11, 2020.10
Due to the novel nature of the coronavirus—as well as its ongoing
mutation and rapidly spreading new strains—the modes of transmission
remain unclear. Indisputably, transmission can occur through contact or
droplet transmission—“direct, indirect, or close contact with infected
people through infected secretions such as saliva and respiratory
secretions or their respiratory droplets, which are expelled when an
infected person coughs, sneezes, talks or sings.”11
More than a year after the novel virus was first identified, the
possibility of true, airborne transmission was still up in the air.12 The
World Health Organization defines airborne transmission “as the spread
of an infectious agent caused by the dissemination of droplet nuclei
(aerosols) that remain infectious when suspended in air over long distances
and time.”13 While it is clear that airborne transmission is possible during
people happened elsewhere,” and referencing conspiracy theories implicating the
Wuhan Institute of Virology).
10. Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, supra note 8. The definition
of a pandemic is “an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area,
crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people.”
A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 185 (John M. Last ed., 4th ed. 2001).
11. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Implications for Infection Prevention
Precautions, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/newsroom/commentaries/detail/transmission-of-sars-cov-2-implications-for-infectionprevention-precautions [https://perma.cc/3JBD-8J3A].
12. Brian Resnick, Scientists Say the Coronavirus Is Airborne. Here’s What
https://www.vox.com/science-andThat
Means.,
VOX,
health/2020/7/13/21315879/covid-19-airborne-who-aerosol-droplet-transmission
[https://perma.cc/WT6D-7793] (last updated Oct. 5, 2020). In the field of public
health, airborne transmission and droplet transmission are similar but distinct
concepts. Scientific Brief: SARS-CoV-2 and Potential Airborne Transmission,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov
/coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/scientific-brief-sars-cov-2.html [https://perma.cc/
UR8C-6WCW] (last updated Oct. 5, 2020). While both refer to spread through
respiratory droplets, airborne transmission is characterized by smaller droplets
and particles than can remain suspended in the air over longer distances (usually
farther than 6 feet) and periods of time (hours). Id. Although the possibility of true
airborne transmission remains unclear, it is clear that the primary mode of
exposure is through respiratory droplets. Id.
13. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Implications for Infection Prevention
Precautions, supra note 11.
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medical procedures that produce aerosols, it is not clear if the coronavirus
can be spread through aerosols without aerosol-generating procedures.14
Other possible modes of transmission include fomite transmission, or
transmission through contaminated surfaces (no specific reports directly
demonstrating transmission, despite consistent evidence that the virus can
contaminate and survive on certain surfaces); bloodborne transmission
(possible but unlikely); and intrauterine transmission (no evidence so far,
but data are limited).15
The incubation period for the coronavirus is up to 14 days after
exposure, with a median time of 4 to 5 days from exposure.16 The
coronavirus impacts individuals in different ways. As of November 2020,
the estimated proportion of asymptomatic individuals testing positive for
COVID-19 varied widely, with estimates ranging from 20% to 40% for
the general population.17 The risk of a severe case of the coronavirus
increases with age; the greatest risk for severe illness from COVID-19 is
for those 85 or older.18 Those with underlying medical conditions are also
at increased risk for severe illness.19 The most common symptoms include
fever, dry cough, and tiredness.20 Yet, a range of less common symptoms
occur as well, including aches and pains, sore throat, diarrhea,
conjunctivitis, headache, loss of taste or smell, skin rash, and discoloration
of fingers or toes.21 In severe cases, symptoms include difficulty breathing
or shortness of breath, chest pain or pressure, and loss of speech or
movement.22
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/
clinical-guidancemanagement-patients.html [https://perma.cc/MT4X-B8YD] (last updated Dec. 8,
2020).
17. COVID-19 Science Update Released: November 17, 2020 Edition 65,
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
CTRS.
https://www.cdc.gov/library/covid19/111720_covidupdate.html [https://perma.c
c/MB2T-73PX] (last updated Jan. 20, 2021).
18. Older Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precaut
ions/olderadults.html [https://perma.cc/Z72A-ULE2] (last updated Dec. 13, 2020).
19. Id.
20. Coronavirus: Symptoms, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/
health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_3 [https://perma.cc/NW76-RKW4] (last visited
Jan. 16, 2021).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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The early symptoms, which include fever and sore throat, can be easily
mistaken as symptoms of a less lethal illness.23 Unfortunately, these mild
early symptoms likely lead patients to delay diagnosing and treating their
illness. Additionally, nonspecific symptoms sometimes hinder medical
professionals from accurately diagnosing the virus, since these symptoms
are often associated with more common, less lethal diseases.24 As of
January 27, 2021, the CDC reports 25,152,433 cases of COVID-19 in the
United States.25 As of that same date, 2,149,700 people have died
worldwide due to COVID-19.26
B. Ebola Epidemic
During the autumn of 2014, the spread of the Ebola virus from West
Africa to developed Western nations triggered a wave of international
anxiety.27 The outbreak likely spread from a single boy who played near
fruit bats in Guinea to approximately 28,603 individuals in 10 countries,
illustrating the dangers of the spread of communicable diseases in the
world today.28 Although only 11 people were treated for Ebola in the
United States during this epidemic and only two of them died from it, the
outbreak lingered for two and a half years, ravaging West Africa and
23. See infra note 43 and text accompanying, discussing similar early
symptoms in the Ebola context.
24. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Diagnosis, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Nov. 5. 2019), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/diagnosis/index
.html [https://perma.cc/UCP8-7JLE].
25. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): CDC COVID Data Tracker,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days
[https://perma.cc/S9J3-6MXE]
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2021).
26. As of January 27, 2021, the WHO reported 2,149,700 COVID-19-related
cases worldwide. WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/overview-august-2014/en/
[https://perma.cc/F7LZ-JVK3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
27. See, e.g., Amy Maxmen, Ebola Panic Looks Familiar to AIDS Activists,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 3, 2014, 4:38 PM) http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/
ebola-panic-looks-familiar-aids-activists-281545.html [https://perma.cc/4Y8M2MAS]; Russell Berman, The Quiet End to the U.S. Ebola Panic, ATLANTIC (Nov.
11, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/11/the-quiet-end-tothe-us-ebola-panic-craig-spencer/382623/
[https://perma.cc/9WTM-URQ9];
Carter Evans, Ebola Panic Spreading Much Faster Than Disease in U.S., CBS
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2014, 10:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-panicin-us-spreading-much-faster-than-disease/ [https://perma.cc/23KZ-K2T6].
28. History of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Outbreaks, supra note 6.
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killing 11,325 people.29 The persistence of the outbreak is in part explained
by the pathological origins of the Ebola virus. The virus was likely
zoonotic in origin.30 In other words, it is carried by animal vectors31 and
can be transmitted by these animals to humans.32 However, the long-term
host animal, or the animal reservoir, of Ebola has traditionally been
difficult to pinpoint.33 Although a certain species of African bat is thought
to be the animal reservoir of Ebola, these animals do not display symptoms
of the virus.34
Contrary to rumors during the outbreak, Ebola is not airborne; humans
can only become infected with Ebola through (1) direct contact with the
blood or body fluids of infected animals (either vectors or animals sick
with Ebola), (2) with the blood or body fluids of a person who is suffering
from Ebola, or (3) with objects contaminated with blood or body fluids
from animals or other humans.35 Direct contact with bodily fluids of an
29. 2014–2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/20142016-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/WS89-JQ7X].
30. Almudena Marí Saéz et al., Investigating the Zoonotic Origin of the West
African Ebola Epidemic, 7.1 EMBO MOLECULAR MED. 17, 17–18 (2015); David
M. Pigott et al., Mapping the Zoonotic Niche of Ebola Virus Disease in Africa, J.
OF EPIDEMIOLOGY & GLOB. HEALTH 1, 3 (2014).
31. A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 10 (“In infectious disease
epidemiology, [a vector species is] an insect or any living carrier that transports
an infectious agent from an infected individual or its wastes to a susceptible
individual or its food or immediate surroundings. The organism may or may not
pass through a developmental cycle within the vector.”).
32. Great apes contract Ebola, but they are probably dead-end hosts, like
humans; however, there is evidence that the human outbreaks are linked to bats,
which suggests that bats are the underlying reservoir species. David M. Pigott et
al., supra note 30; see also Almudena Marí Saéz et al., supra note 30.
33. A recent study of the origins of the current Ebola outbreak “expand[ed]
the range of plausible Ebola virus sources to include insectivorous bats.”
Almudena Marí Saéz et al., supra note 30.
34. Guinea Ebola Outbreak: Bat-Eating Banned to Curb Virus, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 25, 2014, 4:50 PM), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26735118
[https://perma.cc/F7X4-3SJS].
35. Anna Almendrala, The Most Destructive Myths about Ebola Virus,
Debunked, HUFFPOST HEALTHY LIVING (Aug. 6, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/06/ebola-myths_n_5655662.html
[https://perma.cc/SUX7-63LF] (discussing rumors about Ebola); Ebola (Ebola
Virus Disease): Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Nov.
5,
2019),
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/
[https://perma.cc/LL58-T9VY].
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infected person can occur during medical procedures, home care, burial
practices, and other ways.36 Since vector species can transport and spread
the disease without manifesting outward signs that they are carriers, the
zoonotic origins of Ebola suggest that it will be difficult, perhaps
impossible, to eradicate all forms of the virus.37
To date, five Ebola species have been identified, and of the five
subtypes, Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV) is the particular strand of the virus
underlying the 2014 Ebola outbreaks.38 ZEBOV is the most lethal strain
of Ebola.39 If contracted, the Ebola virus can affect humans in a number of
ways. The Ebola virus is a severe hemorrhagic fever that causes capillary
linings to leak.40 As the leaking continues, it drains the blood until there is
not enough for proper circulation to continue, eventually leading to
multiple organ failure.41
The incubation period for ZEBOV is 2 to 21 days after contact with
the virus.42 The early symptoms, which include fever, sore throat, and
muscle and joint pain, can be easily mistaken as symptoms of a less lethal
illness.43 Unfortunately, these mild, early symptoms likely lead patients to
delay diagnosing and treating their illness. Additionally, nonspecific
symptoms sometimes hinder medical professionals from accurately
diagnosing the virus, since these symptoms are often associated with more
36. Barriers to Rapid Containment of the Ebola Outbreak, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/overview-august2014/en/ [https://perma.cc/AYB4-RKHQ].
37. See A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 10; see supra
note 31 (defining vector species).
38. Almudena Marí Saéz et al., supra note 30; Nadia Wauquier et al., Human
Fatal Zaire Ebola Virus Infection Is Associated with an Aberrant Innate Immunity
and with Massive Lymphocyte Apoptosis, 4 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES
1 (2010); History of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Outbreaks, supra note 6.
39. Wauquier et al., supra note 38, at 1.
40. Haemorrhagic Fevers, Viral, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who
.int/topics/haemorrhagic_fevers_viral/en/ [https://perma.cc/P2XQ-3JBY] (last
accessed Jan. 16, 2021); DAVID B. JACOBY & R. M. YOUNGSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF FAMILY HEALTH 540 (3d ed. 2005); Wauquier et al., supra note 38, at 1–2
(discussing the effects of ZEBOV compared to other strains of the virus in animals
and stating that more research is needed to know the exact human responses to
ZEBOV).
41. JACOBY & YOUNGSON, supra note 40, at 540.
42. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Signs and Symptoms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/
symptoms/index.html [https://perma.cc/DD4L-7HJ4].
43. Early symptoms also include severe frontal headache and loss of appetite.
JACOBY & YOUNGSON, supra note 40, at 540.
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common, less lethal diseases.44 If not addressed at its earliest stages,
additional symptoms arise, such as diarrhea, vomiting, bleeding from
orifices and gums, the failure of blood to clot, and multiple organ failure.45
Many cases end ultimately in death.46 By the end of the 2014 to 2016
outbreak, 11,325 people had died from ZEBOV.47 Eleven people—mostly
medical workers—were treated for Ebola in the United States during the
recent epidemic.48
C. Comparing and Contrasting COVID-19 and Ebola
Subsections I.A and I.B above outline the characteristics of COVID19 and Ebola that are needed to understand the legal discussion that
follows. For the convenience of the reader, the chart below summarizes
the key characteristics of each disease.

44. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Diagnosis, supra note 24.
45. JACOBY & YOUNGSON, supra note 40, at 540.
46. The Ebola outbreak resulted in 11,325 deaths. 2014–2016 Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa, supra note 29.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Figure 1: Comparing & Contrasting the Coronavirus and Ebola

Origin
Transmission
Extent of
Spread
Incubation
Period
Range of
Symptoms
Demographics
Medical
Knowledge
Confirmed
Cases in U.S.
as of 1/27/21
Worldwide
fatalities as of
1/27/21

Coronavirus

Ebola

Contact or droplet transmission;
possibility of airborne transmission;
other modes of transmission uncertain

Direct contact with
contaminated blood or
body fluids required; not
airborne
Epidemic (primarily in
West Africa)

Likely zoonotic, but not confirmed

Worldwide pandemic

Zoonotic

Up to 14 days; median of 4 to 5 days
from exposure to symptom onset

2 to 21 days

Asymptomatic; mild to moderate;
severe; death

Generally severe, often
deadly

Elderly and those with pre-existing,
chronic medical conditions at higher
risk of severe complications or death
Still developing; novel virus

N/A

25,152,433

11 (final number treated in
U.S., mostly healthcare
workers)

2,149,700

11,325 (final number)

Reasonably wellunderstood at the time of
the outbreak

II. CONTAINING DISEASE BY RESTRICTING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
There are two bodies of law that authorize, at least in some
circumstances, restrictions on an individual’s right to physical liberty
through confinement to prevent the spread of contagious diseases:
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(1) isolation and quarantine law and (2) civil commitment law.49 This
Section discusses these two areas of law in further detail. Subsection A
analyzes federal and state isolation and quarantine laws and the ostensible
federal limits to state power regarding isolation and quarantine. Subsection
B surveys civil commitment law. Finally, Subsection C evaluates how
Louisiana balances these two avenues to restrict individual liberty with
each individual’s fundamental rights.
A. The Legal Bases for Isolation, Quarantine, and Stay-at-Home Orders
Although in common parlance people use the term “quarantine” to
describe the gamut of liberty-restricting measures used to combat the
spread of communicable diseases, isolation, quarantine, and stay-at-home
orders are all distinct concepts. The CDC defines quarantine as
“separat[ing] and restrict[ing] the movement of people who were exposed
to a contagious disease to see if they become sick.”50 This is
distinguishable from isolation, which “separates sick people with a
contagious disease from people who are not sick.”51 Although not a
quarantine in a medical sense, U.S. courts allow for states to implement
quarantine-type laws of every description, and stay-at-home orders are
part of this general quarantine power.52 For this reason, this Article
considers true, medical quarantine and stay-at-home orders together.
Isolation and quarantine laws allow for the involuntary detention of
contagious individuals (isolation), the restriction of the movement of
people who were exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become
sick (true quarantine), and the requirement of all individuals to stay home,
regardless of their status as contagious, exposed, or otherwise (broad stayat-home orders).
This Subsection discusses: (1) the federal government’s public health
powers, especially those relating to quarantine and isolation, and (2) the
49. Paula Mindes, Tuberculosis Quarantine: A Review of Legal Issues in
Ohio and Other States, 10 J. L. & HEALTH 403, 408–09 (1996) (concisely
describing the applicability of these two bodies of law to the containment of
communicable diseases).
50. Quarantine and Isolation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/ [https://perma.cc/BA9R-NKP3] (Sept. 29, 2017).
51. Id.
52. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (the Supreme Court “has
distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact quarantine laws and ‘health
laws of every description;’ indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely within
its territory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people of
other states”).
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states’ general police power to regulate for purposes of health, safety, and
welfare, including isolation and quarantine issues.
1. The Federal Power of Isolation and Quarantine
The federal government’s response to the coronavirus outbreak is the
most recent example in a long line of governmental measures used to
combat communicable disease.53 At the federal level, Congress may pass
laws for public health purposes, but it must do so subject to constitutional
limits.54 More specifically, since the U.S. government is one of
enumerated powers, it must ground any legislative initiatives on a
constitutionally-enumerated power, and traditionally it has regulated
public health through one of its most expansive powers—the power to
regulate interstate and international commerce.55
Today, the federal government is empowered to control
communicable diseases pursuant to the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA).56 In particular, the PHSA provides that the surgeon general, with
the approval of the secretary of health, education, and welfare, may “make
and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent
the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from
53. Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (repealed 1799).
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the
United States be, and he is hereby authorized, to direct the revenue
officers and the officers commanding forts and revenue cutters, to aid in
the execution of quarantine, and also in the execution of the health laws
of the states, respectively, in such manner as may to him appear
necessary.
Id. Even in this early act, the federal government recognized the importance of
state health laws. See also Exec. Order No. 13,909, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,227 (Mar. 23,
2020) (using executive power under the Defense Production Act of 1950 to allow
for the prioritization and allocation of medical resources, including personal
protective equipment, due to COVID-19); Exec. Order No. 14,001, 86 Fed. Reg.
7219 (Jan. 21, 2021) (using executive power to, inter alia, address public health
supply chain to take inventory of resources, address pricing, create a supply chain
strategy, and allow access to the Strategic National Stockpile).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
55. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, Indian tribes, and among the states).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 264. Congress acted pursuant to its commerce power in
enacting the PHSA. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 42 U.S.C. § 264 (authorizing
regulations necessary to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases from
foreign countries into the United States or among the states).
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foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession.”57
a. Federalism’s Central Role in Isolation and Quarantine
As explained above, the PHSA is designed to control communicable
diseases in the transnational or interstate context. At the same time, the
PHSA acknowledges the paramount role of states in handling public health
matters like communicable disease outbreaks, clarifying that for
preemption purposes none of the PHSA’s general isolation and quarantine
laws (which the PHSA refers to as apprehension, detention, and release
laws) should be construed as superseding any provision under state law,
except to the extent that the state law conflicts with a specific exercise of
federal authority.58
During the coronavirus pandemic, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
paramount role of the states in the field of public health and communicable
disease response. In South Bay United Pentecostal Church, the Court
considered California’s cap limiting attendance at religious services to
25% capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower, and ultimately denied
an application for injunctive relief from this cap, with Chief Justice
Roberts specifically noting in his concurrence that the Constitution
primarily entrusts the states with the power to regulate issues of health and
safety.59
The plain text of the PHSA and the Supreme Court’s South Bay
decision both show that promoting public health and safety is first and
foremost a state issue, and the federal government defers to states on these
issues except in enumerated circumstances, such as to protect fundamental
rights or to combat specific communicable diseases identified by the
president from interstate or transnational spread.

57. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a). The language of the statute clarifies that there must
be an interstate or foreign connection “necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the
States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or
possession,” thus satisfying the Commerce Clause requirement. Id. (emphasis
added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 264(e). The preemption provisions also address 42 U.S.C.
§ 266, which deals with special quarantine powers in time of war.
59. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020). But see Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67
(2020). For a comparison of these two cases, see supra note 2.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 231

4/26/21 8:53 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

904

[Vol. 81

b. The PHSA Limits Isolation and Quarantine to Individuals
Reasonably Believed to Pose a Threat of Spreading a Communicable
Disease, and It Only Allows Isolation and Quarantine for
Communicable Diseases That the President Has Enumerated
The PHSA provides that individuals may be apprehended and
examined if it is “reasonably believed” that they are infected with a
communicable disease that is either in a communicable stage or in “a
precommunicable stage, if the disease would be likely to cause a public
health emergency if transmitted to other individuals.”60 The law limits
these apprehension and examination powers in five ways—(1) an
enumerated-disease requirement, (2) an interstate-or-border-control
requirement, (3) a proper-purpose requirement, (4) a reasonable-belief
requirement, and (5) a qualifying-stage requirement. In this way, the law
is designed to address issues that arguably are beyond a state’s power, to
lower the chance of less risky diseases resulting in isolation or quarantine,
and to attempt—at least in theory—to limit pretextual detentions or abuses
to cases of actual necessity.
First, the requirement that apprehension, detention, and conditional
release powers only apply to communicable diseases identified by the
president through executive orders limits the PHSA’s scope.61 The current
list of articulated communicable diseases includes Ebola by name and
likely covers the coronavirus in the broader category of severe acute
respiratory syndromes.62 Perhaps because the broad respiratory syndrome
category should cover COVID-19 anyway, former President Trump chose
not to amend the list and include COVID-19 by name.63 Thus, the federal
government is only empowered to isolate or quarantine individuals to
combat a subset of communicable diseases—those that the president has
identified.
Second, the interstate-or-border-control requirement means that
regulations enacted pursuant to the PHSA can only allow for apprehension
and examination if an individual risks interstate spread of the
60. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1)–(2).
61. Id. § 264(b) (applying to such communicable diseases “as may be
specified from time to time in Executive orders of the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General”); see
Exec. Order No. 13,295, 3 C.F.R. 13295 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,674, 3 C.F.R.
45671 (2015).
62. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 3 C.F.R. 13295 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,674,
3 C.F.R. 45671 (2015).
63. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 3 C.F.R. 13295 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,674,
3 C.F.R. 45671 (2015).
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communicable disease or risks bringing the communicable disease into the
United States.64 This provision implicitly acknowledges federalism
principles explicitly addressed in the preemption provision, by deferring
to states as the starting point for public health law, and limits the federal
involvement to interstate and international border issues.65
The third, fourth, and fifth requirements—proper purpose, reasonable
belief, and qualifying stage—provide at least some safeguards to prevent
pretextual detention or abuse of federal detention power. These
requirements show that the subtext of the PHSA addresses potential due
process violations by limiting detention of individuals to those who pose
an actual health threat, specifically because they pose a public health
threat.66
The proper-purpose requirement only authorizes federal regulations
providing for the apprehension, detention, or conditional release of
individuals “for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission,
or spread” of communicable diseases identified by the president; in other
words, this provision prohibits pretextual detention of individuals for
reasons other than combatting the spread of communicable disease.67 .
The reasonable-relief requirement grants the surgeon general broad
regulatory authority to combat communicable disease outbreaks by
allowing for apprehension and examination of those “reasonably believed
to be infected with a communicable disease in a qualifying stage.”68 Yet,
there is no definition of what constitutes a “reasonable belief.”
Finally, the qualifying-stage requirement theoretically limits the
ability to apprehend or examine an individual to those individuals who
pose an actual, live risk of transmission, rather than a hypothetical risk of
64. Apprehension is restraining the physical liberty of an individual through
detainment measures like isolation or quarantine. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1)
(apprehension and examination only available if the individual is moving or about
to move from one state to another or could be a probable source of infection to
individuals who will be moving from one state to another); id. § 264(c) (regarding
regulations for persons entering from foreign countries).
65. See supra Section II.A.1.a.
66. Id. § 264(a) (articulating that the purpose is to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of such communicable diseases without listing any other
reasons).
67. Id. § 264(b). Although the principle of inclusion unis et exclusion alterius
should make this obvious, the statute should go further and—to be crystal clear—
explicitly state that the sole motive for apprehension or detention must be
preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of a communicable disease.
Because this Article’s focus is on Louisiana legislative reform, this proposal is
not further discussed.
68. Id. § 264(d)(1).
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transmission. With respect to a communicable disease under the PHSA, a
“qualifying stage” means either a communicable stage or a
precommunicable stage, but only if the disease would cause a public health
emergency if transmitted to other people.69 In theory, if an individual with
the disease in a precommunicable stage poses no risk of creating a public
health emergency—for example, if the disease is mild enough that its
spread would not cause a public emergency, or that can only be spread
under unique and rare conditions—then isolation and quarantine should
not be available. Interestingly, this presupposes an understanding of how
and when a disease is communicable—which, as the COVID-19 pandemic
has shown, is not always known or knowable at the time of government
action. Likewise, the risk of a public health emergency is not always clear
for novel diseases.
c. The PHSA Provides Penalties for Violations of Quarantine Laws
Any person who breaks quarantine regulations, including
apprehension or detention regulation, shall be punished by “a fine of not
more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.”70
2. The General Police and Public Health Power of the States
Although the PHSA grants the federal government vast quarantine and
isolation authority—with no definition of what constitutes a “reasonable
belief,” no restrictions on mixed motives (thus opening the door to
pretextual apprehension and detention), and no definition of what would
cause a qualifying public health emergency if an individual who is not in
the communicable stage is detained—the bulk of quarantine and isolation
authority actually resides with the states.71 In a long line of cases, the
Supreme Court has addressed and embraced the sweeping extent of state
power regarding quarantine and isolation, prioritizing federalism over
fundamental rights. This case law clashes with constitutional guarantees
that protect individuals from arbitrary state action and state-sanctioned
discrimination.
69. Id. § 264(d)(2).
70. Id. § 271 (these mandatory penalties are for regulations prescribed under
§ 264, which is what this Article has addressed; § 266, which governs special
quarantine powers in time of war; and § 269, which governs bills of health).
71. General police power is reserved to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
For a discussion of the interplay between the Americans with Disabilities Act and
quarantine and isolation law, see infra notes 94–124 and accompanying text.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 234

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

ASHES TO ASHES

907

a. Historically, Supreme Court Deference to State Authority
Regarding Isolation and Quarantine Legislation Has Promoted
Federalism at the Expense of Fundamental Rights
Some cases have contemplated the Commerce Clause as an avenue for
limiting state government authority regarding isolation and quarantine
through federal action.72 The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted
the Commerce Clause narrowly when considering the constitutionality of
state isolation and quarantine legislation.73 For example, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, the Court emphasized that quarantine laws were fundamentally
public health laws within the purview of state legislative authority, even
while acknowledging that quarantine laws affect interstate commerce.74
The Supreme Court decided Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A
Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health in the same vein.75 In that case,
the Court upheld a Louisiana statute that empowered the Louisiana Board
of Health to prohibit the introduction of immigrants into any infected
portion of the state when the board judged that their introduction would
increase the prevalence of the disease.76 It reasoned that even though such
a prohibition would affect interstate and foreign commerce, the statute was
a valid exercise of Louisiana’s state power, at least absent congressional
action on the issue.77 The Supreme Court has not addressed how
Congress’s passage of the PHSA—including provisions related to
interstate and international travel—impact the Compagnie Francaise rule,
although because of the preemption clause, the primary power would
likely continue to reside with the states unless the surgeon general passed
regulations that created an actual conflict with a state law. As Gibbons and
Compagnie Francaise show, Commerce Clause challenges to state
isolation and quarantine laws have generally been unsuccessful.
Other cases instead focused on the Fourteenth Amendment as a
limitation on state isolation or quarantine powers. For instance, in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a landmark public health case, the Supreme
Court stated, “Although this court has refrained . . . from any attempt to
define the limits of that [general police] power, yet it has distinctly
recognized the authority of a state to enact quarantine laws and ‘health
72. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 20, 71–72 (1824); Compagnie Francaise de
Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 385, 388 (1902).
73. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 20, 71–72; Compagnie, 186 U.S. at 385 at 388.
74. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1, 71–72.
75. 186 U.S. at 385, 388.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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laws of every description.’”78 In Jacobson, the Court ultimately rejected
the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment objection to a statute authorizing
a local board to require an arguably dangerous79 smallpox vaccination and
to fine all those who refused to comply.80 The Court reasoned that the
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution was not absolute and that living in
an organized society requires and justifies many restrictions on
constitutional liberties to promote the safety of the public.81 Thus,
Jacobson prioritized public safety over individual safety and bodily
autonomy by allowing states to forcibly vaccinate individuals.
State courts have joined the Jacobson Court in rejecting Fourteenth
Amendment objections to state quarantine laws. In Ex parte Company, the
Supreme Court of Ohio also explicitly rejected Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to the state exercise of police power within the context of
quarantine legislation.82 Similarly, in Moore v. Draper, the Florida
Supreme Court upheld a state quarantine statute when presented with a
habeas corpus request challenging detention, reasoning that Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses were not intended to limit state police
power any more in the field of state quarantine laws than they were in any
other field.83 Taken together, Jacobson, Ex parte Company, and Moore
show that courts have historically prioritized state quarantine laws and
public health powers over the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, courts have also considered the isolation and quarantine law
in the context of the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution prohibits the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus “unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”84 The “Great
Writ”—as it is called—“was designed to protect every person from being
detained, restrained, or confined by any branch or agency of

Id.

78. 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905).
79. See id. at 37 (discussing the potential dangers of the vaccine).
80. Id. at 39.
81. Id. at 26.
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized
society could not exist with safety to its members.
82. 139 N.E. 204, 205–07 (Ohio 1922).
83. 57 So. 2d 648, 649–50 (Fla. 1952).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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government.”85 The Supreme Court has stated, “The scope and flexibility
of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always
been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers.”86 In
O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court considered a writ of habeas
corpus in a non-criminal case—albeit in a civil-commitment context rather
than a quarantine-or-isolation context.87 In that case, Donaldson filed a
class action complaint asking for habeas corpus relief for himself and all
members of the class.88 On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the civil
commitment standard, reasoning that “a State cannot constitutionally
confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members and friends.”89
Yet, earlier state courts addressed communicable-disease-based
confinement in the context of a habeas corpus challenge, reaching more
questionable conclusions. In In re Caselli, a detained woman (allegedly a
prostitute) suffering from gonorrhea applied for a writ of habeas corpus to
the Montana Supreme Court because she was detained without a hearing
and based on factual challenges regarding her affliction or the threat she
posed through her conduct.90 In that case, Chief Justice Brantly expressed
his disbelief that the Framers of the United States and Montana
Constitutions could have envisioned a system that prevented a state from
protecting itself through “prompt and speedy action from the spread of a
contagion.”91 The Montana Supreme Court ultimately discharged the writ
and remanded the detainee to custody “until she shall become cured or
until she may be safely allowed to go at large.”92 The Caselli court
implicitly addressed how gonorrhea could be transmitted by focusing on
the detainee’s status as a prostitute (presumably because that is how the
disease could spread), but did not discuss any of the following: lesser
measures for preventing spread, the risk of disproportionally targeting
traditionally disenfranchised groups, or any timeline for her release other
85. Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206, 1208 (1969).
86. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).
87. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 565 n.1 (1975). The civil
commitment aspect of this case is discussed in more detail in infra Subsection
II.B.3.
88. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 565 n.1.
89. Id. at 576.
90. 204 P. 364, 365 (Mont. 1922).
91. Id. at 364–65. The opinion specifically rejects the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to this line of cases. Id. at 364.
92. Id.
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than until she was “cured” or could safely be allowed to go at large again—
whatever that means. Similarly, in In re McGee, the Supreme Court of
Kansas denied habeas relief to detainees allegedly suffering from venereal
disease who had been moved to a state penitentiary for lack of other
available space.93
Together, O’Connor and Caselli suggest that the writ of habeas corpus
is one of the most powerful constitutional tools a detainee can use to
challenge curtailment of physical liberty through improper isolation or
quarantine.
b. Federal Statutory Limits to State Public Health Powers
Despite the lack of success of frontal Commerce Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to isolation and quarantine law, they
remain key federal limits to improper detention based on discriminatory
state laws through the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)
(collectively referred to herein as “ADA”).
Congress used its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause to enact the ADA, which became law in 1990.94 In
particular, the ADA relies on the Equal Protection Clause to protect a class
93. 185 P. 14 (Kan. 1919) (denying habeas relief to detainees allegedly
suffering from venereal disease who had been moved to a state penitentiary for
lack of other available space); see also infra notes 118–124 and text
accompanying.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018). In the introductory fact-findings in the initial
version of the ADA, Congress stated as follows:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1990). This language evokes the language in footnote
four in the case of United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (promoting heightened scrutiny for classes of discrete and insular
minorities). Interestingly, in 2008 Congress amended this portion of the ADA,
deleting the section on individuals in discrete and insular minorities. Pub. L. No.
110-325, 22 Stat. 3554 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705); see also Michael L. Perlin,
The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes be Undone?,
8 J. L. & HEALTH 15, 15–16 (1993) (discussing the constitutional importance of
the prior language for Fourteenth Amendment claims under the ADA);
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2018).
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of people—individuals with disabilities—from discrimination.95 Since the
congressional power underlying the ADA springs from the Constitution,
it preempts state quarantine laws that violate constitutional strictures.96
The ADA defines an individual with a disability as one who has a
“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities of such individual” or as one who has “a record of such
impairment.” Individuals who are merely “regarded as having such an
impairment,” even if, in fact, they do not have a qualifying impairment,
still receive the protection of the ADA; however, an individual cannot be
“regarded as having such an impairment” for impairments that “are
transitory or minor.”97
Communicable diseases can, but do not always, qualify as disabilities
under the ADA; for example, the Supreme Court has applied the ADA to
cases involving tuberculosis and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).98
However, there is a “direct threat” defense to the ADA.99 Under Title I of
the ADA, which governs employment, the direct threat defense allows for
an employer to use qualification standards, including “a requirement that
an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace,” to screen or deny a job or benefit to an
individual with a disability.100 Similarly, Title III of the ADA, which
governs private entities open to the public, provides a direct threat

95. Perlin, supra note 94, at 15–16.
96. See supra Section II.A.2.a (discussing cases involving state laws which,
if decided today, would need to consider the ADA when assessing compliance
with federal law); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (the Supremacy Clause).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)–(3); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). A transitory
impairment is one “with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”
42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(3)(B).
98. Individuals with tuberculosis can qualify for ADA protection. Sch. Bd. of
Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280–81 (1987) (tuberculosis can qualify as
a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630–
32 (1998) (construing the ADA to grant at least as much protection to individuals
with disabilities as the Rehabilitation Act and holding that an HIV infection that
had not yet progressed to the symptomatic phase was nonetheless a disability
under the ADA because an HIV infection prior to the symptomatic phase qualifies
as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . of
the major life activities [of an infected individual]”).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12113(b) (direct threat in employment context); 28
C.F.R § 35.139 (direct threat and public entities); 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (direct threat
and places of public accommodations).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–(b).
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exception.101 Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of
government legislation regarding communicable diseases, Title II of the
ADA, which applies to government entities, incorporates a similar
defense.102
Title II prohibits discrimination by public entities, including state and
local governments and their departments and agencies, for public
services.103 It states: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”104 Although forced
detention based on state power is arguably not a qualifying “benefit,” as
such, it would still likely be covered by Title II based on the broad right of
individuals with disabilities to be free of “discrimination by such
entity.”105 Furthermore, even though detention is not in and of itself a
qualifying “benefit,” if some quarantined detainees were denied benefits
given to other patients, such as certain food options or family visitation
rights, then they would still have a claim under the “benefits of services,
programs, or activities” clause.106
Of the three types of the physical liberty restrictions in the
communicable disease context—isolation, quarantine, and stay-at-home
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual
to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term “direct
threat” means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or
procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
Id. § 12182(b)(3).
102. Id. §§ 12131–34; id. §§ 12141–50; id. §§ 12161–65.
103. Id. § 12131(1).
104. Id. §12132. For the purpose of the ADA, a “qualified individual with a
disability” is an individual who “meets the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity.” Id. §12131(2).
105. Carlos A. Ball & Mark Barnes, Public Health and Individual Rights:
Tuberculosis Control and Detention Procedures in New York City, 12 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 38, 58–59 (1994) (questioning whether detention for public health
purposes involves state entities providing “benefits of services, programs, or
activities”).
106. Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 559, 561 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming a prisoner’s award of damages for lack of program access to, among
other things, visitation facilities).

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 240

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

ASHES TO ASHES

913

orders—isolation laws are the ones that are most likely to have the direct
threat exception apply. Because isolated individuals are separated from
others because they have a contagious disease the direct threat exception
could apply to isolated individuals as long as the disease poses a qualifying
significant risk and is not too temporary or minor to qualify. Under these
circumstances, the direct threat exception would allow for isolation of
these individuals. In other words, state laws that regulate the spread of
communicable diseases operate in harmony with the ADA to the extent
that individuals with qualifying disabilities, including contagious diseases,
pose a direct threat to public health and safety.
To the extent that state laws discriminate against individuals with
communicable diseases that qualify as disabilities, even when those
individuals do not pose a direct threat, those state laws violate the ADA.
Isolating an individual who poses only a hypothetical threat to public
safety would likely fail the significant risk requirement. This type of
action prioritizes speculation over an individualized assessment of the
risks posed by the individual. For example, an Ebola-positive individual
may pose a low threat to society at large because that disease is
comparatively difficult to transmit, whereas a COVID-19-positive
individual may pose a higher threat of transmitting the disease because it
can be transmitted through droplets or, possibly, even through the air.
Since isolation laws target individuals whose impairments are diseases
that could spread to others (which could, depending on the disease, create
a significant risk), the ADA probably does not apply to these laws because
isolation presupposes the existence of the disease, which in turn could pose
a significant risk to the community and qualify as a direct threat.107
State quarantines are a different story. Because a true quarantine
restricts the liberty of individuals who have merely been exposed to a
contagious disease to see if they are in fact infected, the direct threat
exception would not apply at all, since the threat of danger is merely
hypothetical. However, only a quarantined individual who was later
determined to actually have the communicable disease could be a
qualifying individual under the ADA.
The legislative history of the ADA shows the thought process behind
the direct threat exception:
[I]f a state or locality has a disease control law or any other public
health law, which applies to certain people with disabilities (for
example, if a state has a law which required people with certain
contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, to take certain
107. See supra notes 50–52 and text accompanying.
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precautions), that law [will] not be preempted by the ADA as long
as the requirements of that state or local law were designed to
protect against individuals who pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of others.108
Quarantine laws are designed to target people who have merely been
exposed to and potentially have a communicable disease like the
coronavirus or Ebola.109 Since quarantined individuals may not even be
contagious, they might not pose any threat—much less a “direct” threat—
to the health or safety of others.110 Nevertheless, since the ADA’s
definition of “disability” includes those who are regarded as having an
impairment, even if it does not actually exist, individuals who have been
exposed to a contagious disease—at least one permanent enough to qualify
as a disability—would have a statutory right to be free from discrimination
based on their perceived impairment.111 Thus, an analysis of the statutory
text suggests that the ADA does not preempt state isolation laws where the
disease poses a significant risk, but could preempt state quarantine laws
for diseases that count as qualifying disabilities.112
The Constitution, the federal statutes, and the case law discussed
above reflect state governments’ broad authority to enact isolation and
quarantine laws to promote health and safety.113 Direct Commerce Clause,
Fourteenth Amendment, and habeas corpus challenges to state quarantine
laws have met with little success.114 Although the Commerce Clause
empowers the federal government to restrict individuals’ liberty, even in
foreign and interstate commerce cases the Supreme Court has traditionally
108. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 84 (1990).
109. See supra notes 50–52 and text accompanying.
110. See supra notes 50–52 and text accompanying. Because quarantines are
prophylactic measures, they need not confine a threat; they merely confine
potential threats as a precaution.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)–(3).
112. Although it is conceivable that an individual could pose a direct threat by
merely being a possible carrier of a communicable disease, the definition of direct
threat suggests that such a determination would have to be made on a case-bycase basis. Id. § 12182 (b)(3). The “significant risk” element of direct threat
suggests that quarantine would be available only for the most highly
communicable diseases (likely those that are airborne). Similarly, the
modification element would mean that any quarantine would require ad hoc
analysis of possible alternative modifications (other than quarantine) that could
eliminate the risk. Under this view, state quarantine laws might not violate the
ADA on their face and yet still violate it in their application.
113. See supra notes 50–112 and text accompanying.
114. See supra notes 72–93 and text accompanying.
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deferred to states in the field of isolation and quarantine law; state
quarantine laws have been upheld when no federal legislation addressed
the issue.115 These generalizations about federalism, coupled with the
apportionment of most isolation and quarantine power to states within our
system, have at times led to shocking results.116
For instance, in Ex parte McGee, a case out of the Supreme Court of
Kansas in 1919, the court considered a Kansas statute that empowered the
board of health to regulate for isolation and quarantine purposes.117 In
McGee, detainees were allegedly suffering from “venereal disease.”118 The
board’s subsequent regulations granted health officers wide-ranging
authority to uncover occurrences of certain venereal diseases, to isolate
persons with or reasonably suspected of having the diseases, and to
quarantine and treat such persons.119 The detained individuals were in
custody, and a health officer sought to move them to a state penitentiary
for lack of other available space.120 The court denied habeas corpus to the
detainees with venereal disease, even though uncovering their venereal
diseases involved invasive examination, and the non-criminal detainees
were held in a penitentiary.121 The scenario presented in McGee highlights
the dangers that extreme state legislation can pose: discrimination against
115. See supra notes 72–77 and text accompanying.
116. Ex parte McGee, 185 P. 14 (Kan. 1919) (denying habeas relief to
detainees allegedly suffering from venereal disease who had been moved to a state
penitentiary for lack of other available space).
117. Id. at 14–15.
118. Id. at 16–17. The McGee court used the term “venereal disease.” I have
retained the use of that outdated term in referring to this case because it shows
how quarantine and isolation laws can be used to target disfavored groups or
individuals with disabilities.
119. Id. at 15–17.
120. Id. at 15, 17.
121. Id. at 15, 16–17. The rules and regulations promulgated by the state board
of health discriminated against pimps and prostitutes by authorizing health
officers or their representatives “[t]o make examinations of all persons reasonably
suspected of having [certain venereal diseases]. Owing to the prevalence of such
diseases among pimps and prostitutes, all such persons may be considered in the
above class.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The court brushed aside the argument
that the detainees could not be confined in a penitentiary for disease by making
an unclear distinction between the penitentiary itself and mere utilization of
penitentiary facilities and equipment. Furthermore, it reasoned that even though
the detainees were detained “[in] physical facilities constituting part of the
penitentiary equipment,” the “interned persons [were] in no sense confined in the
penitentiary, and [were] not subject to the peculiar obloquy which attends such
confinement.” Id. at 17.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 243

4/26/21 8:53 AM

916

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

certain groups of people suspected of having a communicable disease;
discrimination against those suffering from a disease; invasive physical
examination of the ill or those suspected of being ill; confinement of the
innocent in a penitentiary (or, as the Supreme Court of Kansas phrased it,
in the “physical facilities constituting part of the penitentiary
equipment”);122 and denial of habeas relief.123
As this subsection has shown, the federal and state governments share
the power to enact public health legislation. The federal government
oversees quarantine and isolation through the Commerce Clause via the
PHSA, whereas state governments retain broad authority to regulate for
purposes of health, safety, and welfare, including quarantine and isolation
issues. The writ of habeas corpus and the ADA are two federal limits to
this expansive exercise of state legislative power of isolation and
quarantine.
B. Civil Commitment Law
States are not limited to their vast authority under quarantine and
isolation laws when stopping the spread of infectious diseases; they may
also rely on civil commitment procedures to deprive individuals of their
physical liberty. Public health federalism cases like Gibbons and
Compagnie Francaise developed in a legal environment preceding the
strengthening of due process requirements and the evolution of the
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that evolved during the Civil Rights
era.124 These developments have led to a shift in how the law addresses
involuntary incarceration in public health and civil commitment cases.125
As a result, there is a gap between precedent involving isolation and
quarantine and the modern understanding of due process rights.126 This
subsection discusses procedural and substantive due process in the civil
commitment context. First, it outlines the development of due process

122. Id. at 15.
123. Id.
124. Rosemary G. Reilly, Combating the Tuberculosis Epidemic: The Legality
of Coercive Treatment Measures, 27 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 101, 109–30
(1993) (discussing the separate evolution of public health law and civil
commitment law and the emergence of expanded due process rights to address
contagious disease control).
125. Id. at 109–30; Mindes, supra note 49, at 413–14.
126. Reilly, supra note 124, at 118 (discussing the difference between these
two bodies of law and AIDS); Mindes, supra note 49, at 416–18 (discussing the
difference of these two bodies of law and tuberculosis).
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jurisprudence during the 20th century. Second, it analyzes procedural due
process. Finally, it surveys substantive due process.
1. The Evolution of Due Process
Beginning mid-century, the Supreme Court started to expand the strict
scrutiny analysis to protect fundamental rights.127 Later, the Court
acknowledged other fundamental rights of particular relevance in the field
of public health, including the right to privacy and the right to refuse
medical treatment.128 Also, starting in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court
started to apply procedural due process protections to all deprivations of
liberty and property.129 The application of this new understanding of
substantive and procedural rights to civil commitment cases starting
during the second half of the 20th century—as cases like O’Connor
show—led to a body of law that presents an alternative legal field for
tackling contagious disease control.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee procedural fairness whenever federal or state practices deprive
an individual of life, liberty, or property.130
2. Procedural Due Process and Civil Commitment
Procedural due process rights are particularly important in civil
commitment cases because they ensure that an individual will be given
notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal.131 However, a hearing
127. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (fundamental right to
marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (fundamental right to
procreate); Reilly, supra note 124, at 119 (discussing fundamental-rights
jurisprudence in the 1960s).
128. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (recognizing a
“penumbral” constitutional right of privacy); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–
604 (1977) (recognizing a constitutionally protected zone of privacy but holding
that the right to privacy was not violated by a New York statute requiring patient
prescription identification to the state); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 279–80 (1990) (upholding the standard that individuals have the right
to refuse medical treatment, but approving of a state requirement of clear and
convincing evidence of an individual’s desire to withdraw medical treatment).
129. Reilly, supra note 124, at 120.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950)
(discussing the notice requirement); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)
(discussing the requirement of a hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271
(1970) (discussing the right to a neutral forum in civil proceedings).
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need not precede detention, so long as the government’s interest is
important, the deprivation of rights is not severe, and a hearing follows
promptly.132
Civil commitment jurisprudence has addressed procedural due process
guarantees.133 In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court recognized that
“civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection.”134 In that case, the Court held
that due process required, at a minimum, clear and convincing evidence
for civil commitment.135
In Vitek v. Jones, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that
even prisoners are entitled to certain procedural protections before they
may be involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital for treatment.136 The
plurality recognized that transfer to a mental hospital for treatment was
essentially a medical question, but stated, “The medical nature of the
inquiry . . . does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It
is precisely ‘[the] subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses’ that
justify the requirement of adversary hearings.”137
In Greene v. Edwards, the West Virginia Supreme Court extended the
protections of procedural due process in the context of civil commitment
to commitment in the contagious disease context.138 In that case,
Mr. Greene, an allegedly tubercular individual, was committed under the
West Virginia Tuberculosis Control Act.139 A petition alleged that he was
132. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34, 339–40 (1976) (holding that
due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of
disability benefits); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 60–61, 63–64, 66 (1979)
(holding that a New York law providing for a suspension of a racehorse-trainer
license without a prior hearing was unconstitutional because it failed to require
assurance of a prompt post-suspension hearing).
133. See Ball & Barnes, supra note 105, at 84–89; Reilly, supra note 124, at
123–25; see also supra notes 101–11 and text accompanying.
134. 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
135. Id. at 432–33.
136. The plurality approved of the procedural safeguards that the district court
acknowledged. These included: written notice; a hearing at which the individual
can be heard and present documentary evidence; an opportunity to present
testimony of witnesses and to cross-examine the state’s witnesses; an independent
decisionmaker; a written statement by the factfinder providing the evidence on
which the factfinder relied and the reasons for transfer; legal counsel; and
effective and timely notice of rights. 445 U.S. 480, 482–83, 491, 493–95 (1980).
137. Id. at 495.
138. 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980).
139. Id. at 662.
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suffering from active, communicable tuberculosis, and he was
subsequently notified of a hearing; however, he was not notified of his
right to be represented by counsel at the hearing.140 Mr. Greene was
unrepresented, so after the start of the hearing the court appointed an
attorney to Mr. Greene on the spot.141 It then continued with the
proceedings without taking a recess for Mr. Greene and his attorney to
consult in private.142 The court analogized commitment under the
Tuberculosis Control Act to civil commitment of the mentally ill, and it
reasoned that since commitment under both laws impinged on the right to
“full and complete liberty,” the procedural safeguards of civil commitment
must apply in the tuberculosis context.143 Ultimately, the court granted
Mr. Greene’s writ of habeas corpus, reasoning that “[u]nder the
circumstances, counsel could not have been properly prepared to defend
[him].”144 Greene is a path-breaking case because in it, for the first time, a
court analogized civil commitment procedural protections to the
contagious disease context, thus opening the jurisprudential door for
quarantined and isolated individuals to argue that they are entitled to civil
commitment procedural guarantees.
In its response to the coronavirus, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
consistently prioritized and ordered Louisiana courts to prioritize public
health matters related to the COVID-19 crisis as well as other matters
necessary to protect health, safety, and liberty “as determined by each
court” when managing their dockets and setting trials and hearings.145 It
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 663.
144. Id. at 663–64.
145. ORDER, LA. SUP. CT. (Mar. 16, 2020), available at https://www
.lasc.org/COVID19/Orders/2020-03-16_LASCorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZGP
-HVZY]; ORDER, LA. SUP. CT. (Mar. 20, 2020), available at https://www
.lasc.org/COVID19/orders/2020-03-20_LASC_DEADLINES.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A33G-AZ82] (amending the Court’s Order of March 16, 2020);
LA.
SUP.
CT.
(Mar.
23,
2020),
available
at
ORDER,
https://www.lasc.org/COVID19/orders/
2020-03-23_LASC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4657-W7DP]; ORDER, LA. SUP. CT. (Apr. 6, 2020), available at
https://www.lasc.org/COVID19/Orders/2020-04-06_LASC_DEADLINES.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MEA-5E8J] (limiting in-person proceedings to emergency
matters that could not be resolved virtually, including criminal matters and
COVID-19-related civil matters) (repealing and replacing the Orders dated March
16, March 20, and March 23, 2020); ORDER, LA. SUP. CT. (Apr. 29, 2020),
available
at
https://www.lasc.org/COVID19/Orders/2020-0429_LASC_DEADLINES.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX3H-DA6M]; ORDER, LA. SUP.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 247

4/26/21 8:53 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

920

[Vol. 81

categorized these issues as “emergency matters” worthy of an in-person
hearing, while relegating non-emergency matters to remote hearings.146
While laudable in its goal, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s orders do not
go far enough because they allow a court-by-court determination of what
is “necessary to protect . . . liberty.”147 Because “civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection,” this language affords too much discretion to
individual judges and opens the door to procedural due process
violations.148 While the Louisiana Supreme Court’s coronavirus orders
generally promote procedural due process by generally prioritizing
hearings before Louisiana judges in cases where liberty interests are at
stake, including criminal matters and COVID-19 related matters,
legislative safeguards could codify these types of due process protections.
As it stands, the Louisiana Supreme Court could change these orders at
any time—and indeed, it has altered these orders during the course of the
coronavirus pandemic. In particular, the legislature should codify three
things. First, the legislature should specifically state that there is a right to
a hearing before a judge. Second, the legislature should prioritize all cases
that could result in disease-related deprivation of liberty for hearings to
avoid prolonged detention. Finally, the legislature should add a procedural
safeguard not contemplated by the Louisiana Supreme Court—the right to
be represented by prepared counsel (as in Greene). Taken together, these
three changes would remove judicial discretion as to the necessity of a
hearing involving liberty interests and make sure that individuals’
procedural rights are protected.
3. Substantive Due Process and Civil Commitment
In addition to procedural due process, civil commitment also
implicates substantive due process rights.149 In O’Connor v. Donaldson,
the Court held that a state cannot constitutionally confine an individual
who is not a safety risk if that person is capable of living safely in

CT. (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.lasc.org/COVID19/Orders/202101-11_LASC_ORDER.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB6F-USDR] (encouraging the use
of remote proceedings for all matters with the consent of all parties and the judge)
146. ORDER (Apr. 6, 2020), supra note 145; ORDER (Jan. 11, 2021), supra note
145.
147. ORDER (Mar. 16, 2020), supra note 145; ORDER (Apr. 6, 2020), supra
note 145.
148. 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
149. See Ball & Barnes, supra note 105, at 53–56; Reilly, supra note 124.
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freedom.150 The Supreme Court has accepted that a legitimate, substantial
governmental purpose could support restrictions of fundamental personal
liberties, but such infringements must be narrowly tailored so that the
purpose is achieved through the least restrictive means necessary.151 The
constitutional, least-restrictive-alternative standard has been applied in
civil commitment cases.
For example, in Lessard v. Schmidt, a district court enumerated
guidelines for the least-restrictive-alternative standard in the involuntary
civil commitment context: “[T]he person recommending full-time
involuntary hospitalization must bear the burden of proving (1) what
alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and
(3) why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable.”152 In
Covington v. Harris, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
emphasized that since civil commitment is a severe deprivation of liberty,
alternatives needed to be considered.153 Thus, the Harris court applied the
least-restrictive-alternative standard in the civil commitment context and,
in so doing, placed the burden on the state to show the necessity of its
action and the unfeasibility of less restrictive means of achieving the same,
necessary goal.
In the context of Ebola, panic trumped reason through quarantine and
isolation measures that were not the least restrictive alternative available.
Unlike the coronavirus, Ebola was well-understood at the time of the
outbreak. Federal, state, and local governments understood methods of
transmission, namely, via bodily fluids. Yet, despite this, in one famous
case—that of Kaci Hickox—the government overstepped its authority and
implemented quarantine measures based on fear rather than reason. Even
if there had been a reason for some restriction of liberty, the restrictions
were not the least restrictive alternative.
The Hickox case made headlines at the time of the outbreak. After
spending a month volunteering in Sierra Leone, nurse Kaci Hickox
returned to the United States.154 Although she twice tested negative for
Ebola, she was “sequestered in a medical tent for days because New Jersey
150. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
151. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 490 (1960) (striking down as
unconstitutionally broad an Arkansas statute that required teachers in state schools
to file affidavits listing organizational affiliations and contributions).
152. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
153. 419 F.2d 617, 623–24 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
154. David Sharp, Ebola Nurse to Remain a Voice against Quarantines,
HUFFPOST POLITICS (Nov. 9, 2014), https://apnews.com/article/5f7d56fffde54b
5196896fcc8f75c66c [https://perma.cc/N6ZL-PPH3].
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announced new Ebola regulations the day she arrived.”155 When she was
eventually able to travel to her home state of Maine, the state tried to
impose a “voluntary quarantine.”156 A state judge rejected ultimately
rejected these attempts to restrict her movements, and she herself refused
to stay inside and took a bike ride.157
Ebola was understood, tests were available, and Hickox tested
negative twice. Yet, despite no scientific basis for the detention, she was
forcibly detained in a medical tent for days. Moreover, when she arrived
in Maine, she was subjected to a not-so-voluntary voluntary quarantine,
which ultimately was struck down by a judge since she did not pose a
threat. The two-week quarantine was completely unnecessary because she
had twice tested negative for Ebola at that point. Even if she had Ebola, it
is highly unlikely that a full quarantine was the least-restrictive
alternative—indeed, it seems unlikely that it would be since Ebola is only
transmitted through bodily-fluids. Our society should move past
quarantining and civilly committing individuals with hard-to-transmit
diseases like HIV and sexually transmitted viruses and diseases. The risk
of an individual spreading these diseases is low, and liberty restrictions
can be tailored to avoid full-on detention. For example, if Nurse Hickox
had been Ebola-positive, a court could have ordered her to avoid any
activity that risked sharing or spreading her bodily fluids. Bike riding
would not have posed a significant risk (although of course it would pose
some risk—for example, if she had an accident and needed mouth-tomouth, that could pose a risk to health care workers; even forcing her to
stay home would not eliminate all risk, since she could have a medical
emergency in the house as well). Restrictions on liberty due to fear—and
that go against medical science showing that they are not necessary—are
exactly the types of dangers that arise when isolation and quarantine laws
run amok.
In the context of the coronavirus, the mortality rate has been difficult
to pin down, especially because of testing issues and because it is difficult

155. Maine Nurse to Remain Advocate against Ebola Quarantines, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 9, 2014, 11:21 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-outbreakmaine-nurse-kaci-hickox-to-remain-advocate-against-quarantines/
[https://perma.cc/V6H8-XBFV].
156. Sharp, supra note 154.
157. Ebola Outbreak: Nurse Kaci Hickox Defies Quarantine, BBC NEWS (Oct.
30,
2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29836550
[https://perma.cc/W5ED-7AKE]; Maine Nurse to Remain Advocate against
Ebola Quarantines, supra note 155.
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to measure a moving target.158 The novel nature of the coronavirus also
meant that modes of transmission were equally—and to some extent
remain—unclear.159 What is clear is that it is much more easily transmitted
than Ebola; it can definitely spread through respiratory droplets and may
even be airborne. These two uncertainties create tension from a due
process perspective. On the one hand, especially early on, the uncertainties
surrounding the virus and a messy disaster response worked against each
other. For example, the fatality rate was unknown, which likely made it
harder for governments to weigh the public health need against a given
individual’s liberty (in the early days of the pandemic, the fatality rate was
likely higher, but the development and use of therapeutics and vaccines
has no doubt changed the fatality rate over time). On the other hand, in
many cases, alternatives such as testing or mandatory n-95 mask wearing
existed in theory, but practically speaking were unavailable due to
shortages and logistical failures.
At least under the prevailing, current theory of respiratory droplet
transmission, mask mandates in public places are a less restrictive
alternative that should accomplish the same goal of preventing the spread
of the disease—although whether they are the least restrictive alternative
is an open question. At any rate, given the constitutional approbation of
physical apprehension and detention, it is clear that—despite what antimask protesters may say—mandatory mask wearing does not violate the
Constitution, at least in instances where it is the least restrictive alternative
to stop the spread of communicable disease. Although mandatory mask
wearing could pass constitutional muster, that does not necessarily mean
that it is legal under federal law. In some circumstances it may clash with
the ADA. An individual who challenges a grocery store’s mask mandate
on Title III ADA grounds could hypothetically have an ADA claim, but
the strength of the claim will depend on the circumstances. If the
individual genuinely suffers from a qualifying disability that prevents the
wearing of a mask, the question then becomes whether the direct threat
exception applies and—if so—if the grocery store could offer an
accommodation to mitigate the exclusion. The answer to that question, in
turn, depends on the type of communicable disease at issue. While failure
to wear a mask would not likely pose a direct threat for a disease like Ebola
or HIV, it could pose such a threat for more easily transmissible diseases,
possibly including the coronavirus.
158. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Pandemic’s Big Mystery: How Deadly Is the
Coronavirus?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/04/health/corona
virus-death-rate.html [https://perma.cc/PSC6-WUYS] (last updated Oct. 29, 2020).
159. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Implications for Infection Prevention
Precautions, supra note 11; Resnick, supra note 12.
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Since the evolution of the line of cases on the least-restrictivealternative standard, other standards have been applied as well.160 In
Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court enumerated the substantive rights of
involuntarily committed persons with intellectual disabilities.161 In
Youngberg, the Supreme Court enunciated the standard required for
protecting the substantive due process rights of individuals with
intellectual disabilities who are detained.162 The Court held that a detainee
has a right to safe conditions, freedom from bodily restraint, and a right to
minimally adequate habilitations.163
Even if this less stringent standard is applied, it raises the question of
where and how patients who are highly contagious can be detained.
Typical places where ill or dangerous people are held—hospitals and
prisons, respectively—have been hotbeds of coronavirus outbreaks, and
do not meet the “safe conditions” requirement of the Youngberg standard.
In fact, prisons have been so rife with the coronavirus that some prisons
have released prisoners to slow the spread.164 To minimize the safeconditions requirement in the communicable-disease context,
governments should minimize the number of detentions, isolations, and
quarantines in group settings and opt for lesser options under the leastrestrictive-alternative standard instead.
C. Contagious Disease Control through Restrictions on Individual
Liberty in Louisiana
Because of its subtropical climate, its prominence in international
trade, and its destination as a tourist hotspot—especially for events like
Mardi Gras—Louisiana, and New Orleans in particular, is a likely
candidate for the spread of tropical diseases in the United States. Indeed,

160. Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 104 n.7 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the
different standards and rationales and their current relevance).
161. 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
162. Id. at 309.
163. Id. at 315–16, 319. Courts have questioned the compatibility of the
different standards of the right of treatment in light of the Youngberg decision.
Woe, 729 F.2d at 104 n.7.
164. Bill Chappell, California Will Release Up to 8,000 Prisoners Due to
Coronavirus, NPR (July 10, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
coronavirus-live-updates/2020/07/10/889861014/california-will-release-up-to-8000-prisoners-due-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/2TJ7-PK34].
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some have speculated that Mardi Gras festivities triggered New Orleans’
early surge in cases.165
1. Louisiana’s Sanitary Code
Pursuant to its general power to regulate for the purposes of health,
safety, and welfare, in Louisiana the state health officer has broad
authority to quarantine individuals.166 The secretary of the Department of
Health designates a state health officer who must be a “licensed and
practicing physician in the state of Louisiana.”167 The secretary of health
must approve all of the state health officer’s orders, rules, and
regulations.168 However, in the event that the secretary of health appoints
himself as state health officer, a possibility explicitly allowed under the
law, there is no provision for oversight of the secretary.169 The Sanitary
Code specifically provides for an immunization program and requires “the
reporting[,] . . . investigation, and application and implementation of
appropriate control measures [for the prevention of the occurrence and
spread of communicable diseases].”170 These control measures “expressly
include isolation and quarantine proceedings and measures, for all
communicable diseases of public health significance.”171 Thus, the
Louisiana Legislature has specifically availed itself of its power to restrain
innocent yet sick or potentially sick individuals to promote public
health.172
The Sanitary Code also provides penalties for its violation:
Whoever violates those provisions of the sanitary code dealing
with the isolation or quarantine of communicable disease, or any
person having such a communicable disease that may cause a
severe health hazard to the community and who, after having been
165. Ramon Antonio Vargas, CDC: Mardi Gras Quickened Spread of
Coronavirus in Louisiana; Cancelling Was Never Recommended, NOLA.COM
(Apr. 11, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://www.nola.com/news/coronavirus/article_
dedfb5e4-7c2a-11ea-901f-6720fa25be5a.html [https://perma.cc/YH5K-Z73P].
166. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:5 (2020).
167. Id. § 40:2.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 40:4(A)(2).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also supra note 50 and text accompanying (defining quarantine
as applying to people who have been exposed to a disease to see if they become
sick).
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officially isolated or quarantined . . . violates the provisions of the
isolation or quarantine shall be fined not less than fifty dollars nor
more than one hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not more than
two years or both.173
This means that under Louisiana law the state can restrict the movement
of both ill individuals through its isolation powers or potentially ill
individual who have been exposed to a communicable disease through its
quarantine powers.174 Furthermore, if these individuals violate their
isolation or quarantine, even though it was detention based on illness
rather than on criminal culpability, they could be subject to up to a $100
fine and two years’ imprisonment.175 An individual convicted of violating
the provisions of the code relating to isolation or quarantine “may be
confined either to the parish jail, to any state-operated hospital, or to the
hospital section of the state penitentiary.”176 This introduces a perverse
situation in which individuals who have had their liberty (in some cases
unconstitutionally) restrained can be punished for violating their restraints
with further restraint. (The Nurse Hickox example shows the type of
unjustified detention which runs afoul of Constitution, based as it was on
fear rather than any reasonable, scientific belief, since she had already
tested negative twice).
Although the choice among alternative locations of confinement is at
the court’s discretion, these options highlight the criminal and punitive
facets of public health law.177 The law is silent as to where a quarantined
or isolated individual will be confined, but conceivably the individual
could be contained not only in his or her home, but also in a state-operated
hospital at the discretion of the state health officer or forcibly confined in
the same hospital at the court’s discretion.178 This in turn raises the issue
of safe conditions of confinement discussed above—isolation or
quarantine in one’s home would, perhaps with an ankle monitor to ensure
173. Id. § 40:6(B)(1).
174. Id. § 40:4(A)(2).
175. Id. § 40:6(B)(1).
176. Id. § 40:6(B)(2).
177. Id.
178. See the Louisiana Sanitary Code for the shocking silence of the Louisiana
Legislature regarding what constitutes isolation or quarantine. Id. § 40:4–16. For
the almost imperceptible line between confinement and penal confinement in
some public health cases, consider that the former allows a state health officer to
“isolate or quarantine for the care and control of communicable disease within the
state” and the latter penalizes any person for violating the isolation or quarantine
with a fine, imprisonment, or both. Id. § 40:5(A)(1); id. § 40:6(B)(1)–(2).
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enforcement, in most cases be the least restrictive confinement option, and
it would pose the lowest public health threat due to a smaller number of
individuals being exposed, but that is not always the case. For instance, if
a person were being prophylactically quarantined in their home with
another individual who is being isolated in that same home after having
tested positive, then the quarantined individual (who may not have the
disease) is confined with someone who could give them the disease. In
more worrisome cases, both the law-abiding detainee in isolation or
quarantine and the criminal detainee can be deprived of their freedom of
movement: the detainee either submits to official confinement or is
potentially punished with confinement. They could end up in the same
place—a prison.
The legislature does provide that if any person so confined in either a
state-operated hospital or the hospital of a state penitentiary ceases to
harbor the communicable disease or if the disease is no longer in a
communicable or infectious state, then a district court may, in its
discretion, commute the sentence.179 In other words, under current
Louisiana law, the state may isolate or quarantine an individual, and if the
individual violates isolation or quarantine provisions, he or she may be
detained in a hospital or prison. If the individual is convicted and
subsequently detained, then his or her penal confinement for violating the
prior detainment provisions can continue at the court’s discretion, even
after that individual is no longer a public health threat, such as when a
COVID-19 patient is no longer in a phase that allows for disease
transmission. Yet, the legislature has not included a requirement that
isolation or quarantine be the least restrictive alternative.
Although the Sanitary Code’s provisions allow for “voluntary” and
forcible confinement of innocent individuals, the Louisiana Legislature
did superficially acknowledge the constitutional right to decline medical
treatment, without elaborating on the how any such right would survive
the expansive Louisiana isolation and quarantine laws:
Nothing in this Section is to be construed as depriving any
individual of the right to decline any medical treatment or to
provide other care or treatment for himself or herself at his or her
own expense, which care does not cause a severe health hazard to
the community, provided that the sanitary and quarantine laws,
rules, and regulations relating to communicable disease are
complied with.180
179. Id. § 40:6(B)(2).
180. Id.
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Under this section, an ill individual may ostensibly deny treatment so
long as such denial does not cause a “severe” health hazard.181 The statute
does not define what constitutes a severe hazard, which leaves open the
possibility of forced medical treatment in a myriad of undefined
circumstances, potentially in violation of the individual’s constitutional
rights.
Furthermore, the state health officer’s quarantine powers are not
limited to restricting individuals’ liberty; they also extend to geographic
areas.182 The Sanitary Code empowers the state health officer to quarantine
an entire parish or municipality if it becomes infected “to such an extent
as to threaten the spread of the disease to the other portions of the state.”183
While in some cases this extreme action may be necessary, the open-ended
nature of this regional quarantine power is problematic, especially given
the possibility of no oversight, as in instances where the secretary of health
and the state health officer are one in the same. Once this quarantine has
commenced, the state health officer may prohibit other individuals from
entering “the infected portion” of the state.184 For example, the state health
officer, an unelected official, could prohibit a mother who works in one
uninfected parish from returning home to her children in another, infected
parish, even if she was willing to enter and remain in the infected parish.185
Finally, the state health officer must issue instructions to other local
sanitary authorities regarding measures for quarantining persons and
property coming from the quarantined area.186 Thus, the Sanitary Code
allows not only for the quarantine of individuals, but also for the
quarantine of entire parishes and municipalities, and ingress and egress
from such quarantined localities are almost exclusively regulated by one
individual, the state health officer.
2. The Influence of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
in Louisiana
Although the Sanitary Act provisions discussed above provide the
state health officer with extensive authority to manage communicable
disease outbreaks, the provisions do not expressly address bioterrorism.
However, in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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anthrax scare, the CDC asked Georgetown and Johns Hopkins universities
to draft the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA).187 In
2003, the Louisiana Legislature incorporated most of the provisions in
MSEHPA in the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act (LHEPA).188
Interestingly, Louisiana chose not to adopt the section of the MSEHPA
dedicated to isolation and quarantine.189 However, the legislature did adopt
some quarantine and isolation provisions from the MSEHPA.190 Although
the MSEHPA shares many similarities with the LHEPA and also with the
Sanitary Code, the LHEPA goes further than the MSEHPA in protecting
individual rights in the isolation and quarantine context.191
a. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
In some ways, the MSEHPA pays lip service to constitutional rights
and liberties by couching its isolation and quarantine requirements in the
language of liberty while simultaneously undermining these constitutional
guaranties. For example, it requires isolation and quarantine to be “by the
least restrictive means necessary” to prevent the spread of a contagious or
possibly contagious disease.192 In other words, the MSEHPA requires that
the deprivation of liberty be the least restrictive deprivation of liberty
available. However, the constitutional test requires more than that; not
only should the deprivation be the least restrictive type of deprivation (e.g.,
isolation in one’s home versus isolation in a prison), but there must also
be no less restrictive alternative short of deprivation (e.g., quarantine
187. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring
Infectious Diseases, 288.5 HEALTH L. & ETHICS 622, 622 (2002).
188. Id. § 29:760–72; THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
(2001), https://www.aapsonline.org/legis/msehpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BX46QVP] [hereinafter MSEHPA].
189. Id. § 29:760–72; MSEHPA, supra note 188, at art. VI, § 604.
190. MSEHPA, supra note 188, at art. II, § 202(5)(11)(13); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 29:764(A)(5); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(11); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 29:764(A)(3)(a); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(5).
191. The legislature did not adopt the MSHEPA article detailing quarantine
and isolation measures; it instead chose to incorporate only the quarantine and
isolation language sprinkled throughout other sections of the MSHEPA.
MSEHPA, supra note 188, at art. VI (detailing methods of quarantine and
isolation); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(4)(d); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(5); LA.
REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(6); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(7); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 29:764(A)(8); MSEHPA, supra note 188, at art. II, § 202.
192. MSEHPA, supra note 188, at art. VI, § 604(b)(1).
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versus mandatory masks or 6-feet-apart guidelines). In other ways, the
MSEHPA is more progressive. One MSEHPA provision guarantees the
“effective operation of the judicial system including, if deemed necessary,
the identification and training of personnel to serve as emergency judges
regarding matters of isolation and quarantine.”193
b. Comparing the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act and
the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act
The Louisiana Legislature has adopted comparable provisions to
MSEHPA’s least-restrictive-alternative provision and its effectivejudicial-system provision.194 Thus, although the judicial standard under
both the MSEHPA and the LHEPA are lacking, the existence of judicial
relief itself is, at least, prioritized in some instances. However, both the
MSEHPA and the LHEPA could be improved by elaborating on the
implementation of the effective-judicial-system provision by, for example,
explaining how emergency judges could be selected and trained. The
legislature should amend the LHEPA to clarify that the least restrictive
alternative applies both to types of detention and the category of restriction
(liberty deprivation versus something short of liberty deprivation, like
masks).
c. Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act
In some ways, the LHEPA places a higher value on civil liberties than
does the MSEHPA. For example, under the LHEPA, isolation and
quarantine actions on the dockets receive priority.195 The LHEPA also
affirmatively entitles those in isolation or quarantine to have adequate
communication with their families.196 In these ways, the Louisiana
Legislature wisely added provisions to address at least some of the
problems with the MSEHPA to promote individual rights and human
dignity. However, by choosing not to incorporate an ameliorated version
of the other MSEHPA provisions into the LHEPA, such as correcting the
least-restrictive-alternative provision, the legislature missed an

193. Id. art. II, § 202(5).
194. LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(2)(b); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(4)(d);
see also supra notes 151–52 (discussing the least-restrictive alternative standard
generally), 189–93 and text accompanying (discussing the provisions of the
MSHEPA).
195. LA. REV. STAT. § 29:764(A)(6).
196. Id. § 29:764(A)(7).
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opportunity to re-evaluate the bulk of its isolation and quarantine law.197
Yet, the Louisiana Legislature missed an opportunity to harmonize
conflicts among its different public health laws and due process
requirements.
A body of law dealing with isolation and quarantine and civil
commitment has developed at both the federal and state levels, with certain
federal limits restricting the exercise of state power in this field. Louisiana
has long implemented methods of restricting individual liberty to control
communicable diseases, including through the Sanitary Code and LHEPA.
When addressing restrictions on physical liberty in the communicable
disease context, Louisiana follows the isolation and quarantine route rather
than the civil commitment route, and although its provisions are far from
ideal, in some instances they do offer some protection to the rights of
isolated and quarantined individuals. Louisiana should go a step further
and embrace civil commitment law’s due process framework in the
communicable disease context, much like how the Greene court applied it
to protect the due process rights of the detainee. This would strengthen
liberty protections within Louisiana.
III. CONTAINING DISEASE BY SEIZING PROPERTY
In addition to permitting restrictions on individuals’ physical liberty
to contain disease, both the federal government and state governments also
allow for the seizure of personal property to contain disease.
A. Property under the Public Health Service Act
At the federal level, the PHSA allows the surgeon general to deprive
individuals of property by, for example, exterminating pets or other
animals or destroying infected property.198 It empowers the surgeon
197. See supra notes 121–42 (discussing the Louisiana Sanitary Code). The
LHEPA only applies in a public health emergency. The LHEPA defines a public
health emergency as “an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health
condition that is believed to be caused by . . . [b]ioterrorism, [t]he appearance of
a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin,
[or] a disaster” that “[p]oses a high probability of . . . a large number of
deaths . . . [a] large number of serious or long-term disabilities . . . [or]
[w]idespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk
of substantial future harm to a large number of people.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 29:762(12). The Louisiana provisions on isolation and quarantine are found in
the Sanitary Code. Id.; id. § 29:764; id. § 40:4.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a).
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general to inspect, fumigate, disinfect, sanitize, or destroy animals or
articles “found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of
dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his
judgment may be necessary.”199 In one breath, the law states that these
inspection, disinfection, and destruction powers are limited to animals or
articles “found to be so infected or contaminated,” and in the next breath
it gives the surgeon general power to take “other measures, as in his
judgment may be necessary” without any such limiting language.200
The vast discretion the PHSA gives to the surgeon general goes too
far by allowing the surgeon general to seize and destroy property even if
it is not infected or contaminated, and even if it is not necessary. Property
destruction and animal extermination have come up in the Ebola context,
with differing results.201 Although neither of these instances involved the
federal government or the surgeon general—instead involving Spanish
and Texas authorities dealing with canine exposure to Ebola—the
circumstances are illustrative, and there is nothing to prevent the federal
government from dealing with the same type of issue.202 During the Ebola
epidemic, Excalibur, the dog of an infected Spanish nurse, was seized and
euthanized over fears that it was infected with Ebola or risked spreading
it—despite decades of Ebola research without a single, documented case
of a dog transmitting Ebola to people.203 By contrast, Bentley, the dog of
a Dallas resident infected with Ebola, was seized and quarantined for 21
days.204
B. The Case of Thomas Duncan: A Texas Perspective
State governments have also exercised their isolation and quarantine
power to control inanimate personal property to combat Ebola. The events
199. Id. The statute also empowers the surgeon general to carry out pest
extermination for these purposes, although that seems somewhat redundant given
his authority to destroy animals. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ebola Virus: Spanish Protests as Nurse’s Dog Is Put Down, BBC
(Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29547432
[https://perma.cc/V92X-3GHH].
202. Id.; Ebola Patient Nina Pham’s Dog, Bently, Enters Testing Phase, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:16 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virusoutbreak/ebola-patient-nina-phams-dog-bentley-enters-testing-phase-n229681
[https://perma.cc/T3LG-VRL8].
203. Ebola Virus: Spanish Protests as Nurse’s Dog Is Put Down, supra note 201.
204. Ebola Patient Nina Pham’s Dog, Bently, Enters Testing Phase, supra
note 202.
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surrounding Thomas Duncan’s illness and death during the Ebola outbreak
demonstrate the extent of this power.205 Duncan stayed in his Texas
apartment prior to his diagnosis.206 A crew of workers in hazmat suits spent
38 hours emptying his apartment, heaping “shoes, carpets, mattresses, bed
sheets, clothes and kids’ backpacks into 140 55-gallon drums,” which
were then decontaminated and removed, and the contents incinerated.207
In spite of the fact that Ebola can be killed with many disinfectants, such
as household bleach, and that it can only survive for several hours on dry
surfaces, Duncan’s belongings were incinerated.208 Little was saved from
incineration during the cleanup and “decontamination” of the
apartment.209 Once the incineration of almost all of the earthly belongings
in the apartment was complete, the ashes were shipped to a landfill in
Louisiana.210 However, Louisiana refused to admit the ashes out of fear
that they posed a threat, even though the CDC stated that incinerated Ebola
waste was not dangerous (although it is unlikely that the ashes even
counted as Ebola waste, since the items were decontaminated prior to
incarceration).211
The Texas Health and Safety Code (THSC) addresses the application
of control measures to property in such a scenario.212 Under the THSC, if
the state has reasonable cause to believe that property is infected or
contaminated with a communicable disease, it may quarantine the property
until it can be analyzed to determine if it is, in fact, infected or
contaminated.213 The state may require the person who owns or controls
the property to “impose control measures that are technically feasible to
disinfect or decontaminate the property if the property is found to be
infected or contaminated.”214 If the control measures are ineffective, the
205. See supra notes 205–26 and text accompanying.
206. Ashes from Ebola Victim’s Dallas Apartment in Limbo, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:51 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news
/2014/10/31/ashes-from-ebola-victims-dallas-apartment-in-limbo/
[https://perma.cc/GJU7-64J7].
207. Id.
208. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Transmission, supra note 35; Ashes from
Ebola Victim’s Dallas Apartment in Limbo, supra note 206.
209. Ashes from Ebola Victim’s Dallas Apartment in Limbo, supra note 206.
Salvaged items include a computer hard drive, legal documents, family photos,
and Duncan’s grandmother’s Bible. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.084 (West 2015).
213. Id. § 81.084(a).
214. Id. § 81.084(c).
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state can continue the quarantine and order the person who owns or
controls to property to destroy it.215 Texas also addresses the costs
associated with these control measures: “The person who owns or controls
the property shall pay all expenses of implementing control measures,
court costs, storage, and other justifiable expenses.”216 Thus, under Texas
law the state can quarantine property and test it, and if the test results show
that the property is a threat, it can continue to quarantine the property and
order the property’s owner to impose control or decontamination measures
at the owner’s expense.
A comparison of Duncan’s case and Texas law provides insight into
the actual implementation of property regulations during an epidemic.
Once Texas confirmed that Duncan had the Ebola virus, and since Duncan
had spent time in his apartment before he was taken to the hospital for
treatment, the state acted like it had reasonable cause to believe that
Duncan’s household property was infected or contaminated with Ebola.217
Based on this possible reasonable cause to believe that the property was
contaminated, the THSC would likely allow the initial quarantine of
Duncan’s property and subsequent analysis of the property. Under the
THSC, the state could have also required either Duncan or those
controlling the property in his absence to impose control measures to
disinfect any contaminated property, and if those measures were
ineffective, the state could have further quarantined any contaminated
property and ordered its destruction.218 Finally, Texas could have assessed
all costs associated with the control measures—no matter how high— to
either Duncan or anyone else with control over the property.219
At least judging from the media, this is not what happened. For
example, the media do not mention any analysis of potentially
contaminated property.220 Rather, they suggest that the contents of the
apartment were emptied into barrels, decontaminated, and then
incinerated.221 Salvaged items included family photographs, a Bible, a
hard drive, and legal documents.222 The media reports do not state whether

215. Id. § 81.084(d)(1).
216. Id. § 81.084(g).
217. Ashes from Ebola Victim’s Dallas Apartment in Limbo, supra note 206;
id. § 81.084(a).
218. Id. § 81.084(c); id. § 81.084(d)(1).
219. Id. § 81.084(g).
220. See, e.g., Ashes from Ebola Victim’s Dallas Apartment in Limbo, supra
note 206.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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these salvaged items were analyzed and deemed to be uncontaminated.223
These reports suggest that, in fact, the government did not bother to test
most of the property in the apartment; rather, it merely seized and
incinerated it, almost without exception.224 If this is indeed how the
property control measures were implemented, it is a far cry from the
already scant protection enumerated in the THSC.
Although the state seemingly ignored some THSC protections, so too
did it ignore some provisions that would have been burdensome to Duncan
and his estate. For example, instead of following THSC provisions that
would have charged Duncan with the exorbitant costs associated with
control measures, the state planned to pay for most of them itself.225 In this
way, Texas ignored a provision in its own laws that was clearly
unworkable and instead took financial responsibility for its own control
actions.226
C. Property during a Louisiana Heath Emergency
The case of Duncan in Texas elucidates relevant comparable dangers
to property rights in Louisiana because the LHEPA contains some
provisions similar to the MSEHPA.227 Notably, during a health emergency
in Louisiana, the state may “decontaminate or cause to be decontaminated,
or destroy any material of which there is reasonable cause to believe that
it may endanger the public health.”228 Fortunately, Louisiana does not have
223. Id.
224. Id. The decontamination team was “instructed to strip the place bare,
removing carpeting and window blinds.” Todd Unger, Bill for Cleanup of EbolaTainted Apartment: over $100K, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2014, 5:37 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/09/ebola-cleanup-crew/1698586
5/ [https://perma.cc/94YR-8ARL].
225. Unger, supra note 224.
226. Based on the Duncan case, the Texas cost-assessing provision is
unworkable because the cleanup costs were approximately $100,000 for a single
apartment, and the median household income as reported in the 2012 census was
only $51,371. Instead of having unworkable and unfair laws on the books,
Louisiana lawmakers should get ahead of the issue and clarify that these types of
costs will not be assessed to the individual with the communicable disease.
AMANDA NOSS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME: 2012 (2013), https:
//fitsnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/acsbr12-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/34
6Y-FDGB].
227. See LA. REV. STAT.§ 29:769 (2020).
228. Id. § 29:769(A)(2). More specifically, the provision empowers the
governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to act in
consultation with the secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals, and
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a provision requiring the property owner to pay for the destruction of his
own property in the public health emergency context.229 However, the
example of Duncan shows that in a public health emergency, panic can
lead state governments to seize and destroy property without due process
of law.230
IV. PROPOSAL
This Article provides a legislative proposal for Louisiana lawmakers.
The Louisiana Legislature should take measures that protect individual
liberties to address the outdated state of the isolation and quarantine
jurisprudence in the field of communicable diseases and the overbreadth
of the Sanitary Code and LHEPA regarding quarantine and isolation of
persons and treatment of property.
First, the legislature should enact legislation to explicitly embrace due
process protections using the civil commitment standard in the
communicable disease context. Second, LHEPA should not stop at
requiring that isolation and quarantine be by the least restrictive means
necessary (e.g., isolation in one’s home versus isolation in a prison), but it
should specify that it be the least restrictive type of measure to achieve the
government’s purpose (e.g., social distancing or mask wearing versus
quarantine) (in addition to the form of deprivation as the least restrictive
available), and the Sanitary Code should be amended to specifically
include a least-restrictive-alternative standard. Third, it should explicitly
reject the Texas provisions that burden the property owner. Instead, it
should explicitly require: (1) that destruction of property be necessary for
the government’s purpose and (2) that property destruction is the least
restrictive alternative. Third, it should create a remedy for violations of
these rights—a private right of action with statutory damages. If the
legislature enacts these proposals, it will strike a just balance between
individual liberty and property interests, on the one hand, and the safety of
the community, on the other.
A. Heightened Due Process Protections for the Ill and Innocent
The Louisiana Legislature should expressly adopt civil commitment
due process protections in communicable disease cases and formalize and
expand on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ad hoc orders in the coronavirus
state, regional, and local public health emergency agencies. Id. § 29:769(A);
compare id. § 29:769(A), with MSEHPA, supra note 188, at art. V, § 501(b).
229. Id. § 29:769.
230. See supra Section II.A.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 264

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

ASHES TO ASHES

937

context. Like in the criminal context, physical freedom is implicated in
isolation and quarantine cases. However, although innocent and uncharged
with any wrongdoing, most individuals subject to isolation and quarantine
currently have almost no protection for their liberty interests. It is illogical
to grant potentially culpable individuals with greater procedural
protections than the ill. Because detention is a serious affront to individual
liberty, all individuals should have the guarantee of due process, even in
the public health context. The Louisiana Legislature should (1) require
notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, (2) provide docket
priority to emergency matters related to the coronavirus that affect liberty
and personal property interests, (3) prioritize in-person hearings and trials
for these issues when safe to do so and adopt and allow for remote
alternatives when in-person hearings are not safe, and (4) ensure that
defendants have access to prepared counsel.
In Louisiana, the current isolation and quarantine law is broad, and
individuals can be detained with little recourse. Since the right to personal
liberty is being infringed, the legislature should also incorporate the leastrestrictive-means standard into the Sanitary Code to provide for
uniformity between the Sanitary Code and the LHEPA. Additionally, the
legislature should amend the LHEPA to require that isolation or quarantine
be the least restrictive alternative available before it is implemented.
The legislature should adopt heightened due process standard in cases
affecting personal liberty and property rights. Because of the health threat
to the community, the legislature should provide for expedited review and
limit the time an individual may be held before a hearing to two days.
Furthermore, the legislature should provide for out-of-courtroom hearings.
The legislature should provide for electronic hearings in these cases.
Additionally, where an in-person hearing is essential, the legislature
should provide for the court to come to the detainee and conduct the
hearing through a sterile partition, which would accommodate the ill and
the potentially ill, who may need medical attention or monitoring, by
allowing the detainee to remain in a medical facility. These measures
would have the added benefit of preventing instances like Greene, in
which an allegedly tubercular individual was surrounded by those
involved in the proceeding. Although it is laudable that the court appointed
counsel to Greene on the spot, lawyers, judges, and bailiffs should not be
exposed to a potentially deadly disease when reasonable alternatives exist.
B. Statutory Precision Regarding the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The Louisiana Legislature should clarify individuals’ rights to decline
medical treatment or to provide other care or treatment for themselves
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when such care does not cause a “severe health hazard to the
community.”231 Currently, the law does not define what constitutes a
“severe health hazard to the community.”232 The legislature should
explicitly allow individuals potentially afflicted with diseases that can only
be spread through contact with bodily fluids, such as Ebola and HIV, to
engage in activities that would not spread these diseases. The legislature
should also specify that only individuals in isolation—in other words,
individuals who actually have a disease and pose a known threat—can be
required to undergo state-mandated medical testing or treatment. The state
should allow for mandatory medical testing to determine if an individual
is ill, but should prohibit detention if two tests both show negative results
(as in the Hickox case). All isolation-and-quarantine decisions and
property-destruction decisions for communicable disease purposes should
be required to follow prevailing medical opinion when assessing the
availability of a less restrictive alternative.
C. Prophylactic Measures to Protect Property and Remedies for
Violations of Procedural Safeguards
The Louisiana Legislature should also enact legislation that frees
innocent individuals from any risk of being held financially responsible
for the unlimited cleanup costs associated with mandated decontamination
unless it is caused by their gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct,
or intentional actions. If the owners have done nothing wrong, it is unfair
to force them to attempt to pay for the State’s unilateral efforts to engage
in a sanitation regime. Practically speaking, this is unworkable—few
people would be able to absorb the costs of decontamination. Louisiana
already requires reasonable cause to believe that property is a public health
threat before destruction is an option, but the legislature should expand
this to clarify that reasonable cause must be based on prevailing medical
opinion so as to avoid tragic situations like the death of Excalibur.
Furthermore, the legislature should require analysis of property that may
potentially be destroyed (as is done in Texas) to ensure that the property
is really a threat. Prior to the destruction or incineration of any property,
the legislature should require an assessment showing that destruction is
the least restrictive alternative. Finally, if destruction is required, the
government should pay the owner reasonable compensation for the seized
and destroyed property, enforceable through a private cause of action.

231. Id. § 40:6(B).
232. Id.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 266

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

ASHES TO ASHES

939

Finally, as a prophylactic measure in response to the apparent
misapplication of the law in Texas, the Louisiana Legislature should
provide a private right of action. This private right of action would entitle
any individual who was wrongly detained to sue for statutory damages of
$100 per day of detention or $5,000 total, whichever is greater; these
damage amounts shall be adjusted for inflation every ten (10) years. There
should also be a private cause of action for violation of fundamental rights,
with statutory damages of $5,000 for each violation (also to be injusted for
inflation every ten (10) years). Finally, the legislature should create a cause
of action for damage to destroyed property, entitling the property owner
to reasonable compensation for his lost property and, if his property is
wrongly seized or destroyed, entitling him to treble the value of the seized
or destroyed property. These changes would help ensure compliance with
laws that protect property rights and would, hopefully, deter any future
disregard for the law as occurred in Duncan’s case.
D. Text of Proposed Legislation
The isolation and quarantine provision of the Sanitary Code—
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:40(A)(2)—should be amended by adding
the following language:
(d) Before implementing isolation or quarantine proceedings or
measures, every individual subject to such proceedings or
measures must be afforded the same level of due process
protections afforded by civil commitment law, including a notice
and a hearing before an impartial tribunal.
(i) Isolation or quarantine can only be implemented if it is the
least restrictive alternative available to protect public health and
safety.
(ii) When isolation or quarantine is the least restrictive
alternative available to prevent the spread of a contagious or
possibly contagious disease, then the isolation or quarantine
must be conducted in the least restrictive way possible.
(iii) Any isolation or quarantine must be reasonable in light of
prevailing medical science and recommendations. The
reasonableness of isolation or quarantine must take into account
the risk of transmission and the severity of the health risks
associated with getting the disease.
(iv) Remedies: Any individual may challenge his or her isolation
or quarantine through a writ of habeas corpus or a civil lawsuit
for damages. Any individual whom a court finds to be wrongly
detained or who has been threatened with wrongful detention
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will have a private right of action to sue for his or her detention,
and shall be entitled to statutory damages of $100 per day of
detention or $5,000 total, whichever is greater; these damage
amounts shall be adjusted for inflation every ten (10) years.
(e) To ensure the public safety, individuals who may be subjected
to isolation or quarantine must have an expedited hearing before
a neutral magistrate.
(i) Prior to such hearing, no individual shall be held for more
than two (2) days.
(ii) The hearings for individuals who are ill or potentially ill with
a communicable disease that is transmitted through respiratory
droplets or that is airborne shall permit the detained individual to
remain in a facility that is medically equipped to: treat the disease
or to remain at home and participate in the hearing remotely.
(iii) Such hearings could either take place at the medical facility
with proper safeguards or electronically, at the court’s discretion.
(iv) An in-person proceeding at the medical facility should only
be allowed if the facility is equipped to allow real-time visual
and auditory communication between the detainee and the court.
(v) If the facility is not so equipped, the hearing shall be through
means of electronic communications.
(vi) Failure to conduct a due process hearing in accordance with
this Subsection or invasion of any of the detainee’s other
fundamental rights shall constitute a wrongful detention under
subsection § 40:40(A)(2)(d) and entitle the detainee to bring a
private right of action in accordance with the provisions of
§ 40:40(A)(2)(d).
The least restrictive means provision of the LHEPA—Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 29:764(A)(4)—should be amended as follows:
(d) To be justified, isolation and quarantine must be the least
restrictive means necessary to prevent the spread of a contagious
or possibly contagious disease to others. When isolation or
quarantine is the least restrictive alternative available to prevent
the spread of a contagious or possibly contagious disease, then the
isolation or quarantine must be conducted in the least restrictive
way possible.
(i) Any isolation or quarantine must be reasonable in light of
prevailing medical science and recommendations. The
reasonableness of isolation or quarantine must take into account
the risk of transmission and the severity of the health risks
associated with getting the disease.
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(ii) Remedies: Any individual may challenge his or her isolation
or quarantine through a writ of habeas corpus or a lawsuit. Any
individual may challenge his or her threatened isolation or
quarantine through a lawsuit. Any individual whom a court finds
to be wrongly detained through this writ or who has been
threatened with wrongful detention will have a private right of
action to sue for his or her detention, and shall be entitled to
statutory damages of $100 per day of detention or $5,000 total,
whichever is greater; these damage amounts shall be adjusted for
inflation every ten (10) years.
The emergency measures provision of the LHEPA—Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 29:769(A)—should be amended by adding the
following:
(3) An individual property owner shall not be held responsible for
costs associated with decontamination or destruction of his or her
property unless the contamination of the property was the result
of the property owner’s gross negligence, willful or wanton
misconduct, or intentional actions.
(4) No entity shall destroy property in a health care emergency
unless a netural magistrate after a contradictory hearing
determines that each piece of property is first (a) found to
be infected or contaminated; (b) identified as an actual, direct
threat to the public health; and (c) no reasonable methods of
decontamination may be applied within a reasonable period of
time. Thus, each piece of property must test positive for
contaminating agents or communicable diseases before
destruction. If the property tests positive, it must be
decontaminated and returned to the property owner if reasonable
methods of decontamination are available at the expense of the
State of Louisiana. Property may only be destroyed if, according
to prevailing standards of medical science, such property will pose
an actual, direct threat to public health. If the State of Louisiana
destroys or orders to be destroyed any personal property under this
provision, it shall pay the owner of the property just
compensation.
(5) Private property shall not be seized or destroyed during a
health care emergency if a less restrictive means exists to protect
the public health.
(6) Any violation of provisions (3)-(5) shall give rise to a private
right of action to sue. An aggrieved party under these sections
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shall be entitled to statutory damages of tremble the amount of the
repurchase price of the destroyed items.
CONCLUSION
The coronavirus, Ebola, and other communicable diseases may pose a
great threat to public safety, but the historical responses of state
governments to these threats often undermine the core American values of
individual freedom and property rights. State and federal isolation and
quarantine law and civil commitment law have developed intermittently,
and they do not provide adequate protection for individual rights.
Louisiana avails itself of sweeping public health powers, but it should
reconsider the breadth of its current stance and more narrowly tailor
response options to ensure freedom and property rights are protected. The
legislature can do this by enacting due process protections in the
communicable disease setting, by creating prophylactic measures to
protect property rights during a disease outbreak, and by penalizing those
who disregard safeguards aimed at protecting liberty and property rights
during a public health emergency. Together, these measures will help
protect the community while also respecting the principles of freedom and
property rights.
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